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THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT
COMMON LAW: A LONGER HISTORY
JASON TALIADOROS
ABSTRACT
This Article aims to revisit the historical development of the doctrine of
exemplary or punitive damages. Punitive damages are anomalous in that they lie in
both tort and crime, a matter that has led to much criticism by modern
commentators. Yet, a definitive history of punitive damages does not exist to explain
this anomaly. The main contribution of this Article, then, is to begin such a history
by way of a meta-narrative. It identifies and links the historically significant
moments that led to punitive damages, beginning with the background period of
classical Roman law, its renewed reception in Western Europe in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries that coincided with the emergence of the English common law,
the English statutes of the late thirteenth century, to the court cases of Wilkes v.
Wood and Huckle v. Money in the eighteenth century that heralded the “first explicit
articulation” of the legal principle of punitive damages. This Article argues that this
history is not linear in nature but historically contingent. This is a corrective to
present scholarship, which fails to adequately connect or contextualize these
historical moments, or over-simplifies this development over time.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 252
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ 255
I.
A. The Origins of the Punitive Damages Dilemma ............................ 255
B. The Conflicting Policies Underlying the Punitive Damages
Dilemma ........................................................................................ 255


Senior Lecturer (equivalent to Associate Professor), Deakin Law School (Melbourne,
Australia), jtalia@deakin.edu.au. I would like to thank the individuals and institutions who
contributed to the research and writing of this Article: Professor Danuta Mendelson, who first
suggested punitive damages as a research topic and provided to me her unpublished chapter in
draft form on the history of punitive damages; Professor Paul Brand, who answered numerous
emailed queries with patience and forbearance; Professors Mark Lunney and Paul Mitchell for
their feedback and comments following a presentation at the Australian and New Zealand Law
and History conference in December 2014; Emeritus Professor Michael Bryan, for his
comments on an earlier draft of this Article and a presentation at the Melbourne Law School;
the Legal History Department of the Ludwig Maximilian University,
Munich, in particular Professor Susanne Lepsius, for providing me with a visiting fellowship
in September 2014; the Institute for International Law and the Humanities (IILAH) at the
Melbourne Law School, and my academic host Associate Professor Ann Genovese, for
providing me with a visiting fellowship between August 2014 and February 2015; the
Melbourne Law School Library, in particular Carole Hinchcliff, for research assistance; Ms
Hannah Robert and Dr Ann Wardrop, for inviting me to present at the La Trobe Law School
Seminar series; and, in particular, the Deakin Law School for providing me with institutional
and financial support for a period of Academic Study Leave in the period July 2014 to
February 2015.

251

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

1

252

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:251

C. The Difference Between Aggravated and Punitive Damages ........ 257
PUNITIVE OR COMPENSATORY? PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON TRIAL ............. 257
A. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases and The Role of Juries and Judges in
Eighteenth-Century Damages Awards .......................................... 257
1. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases: Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v.
Money ...................................................................................... 258
2. The Role of Juries and Judges in Determining Damages
Awards ..................................................................................... 259
3. The Shift in Power from Jury to Judge Under the Motion for New
Trial ......................................................................................... 261
B. Possible Route of Doctrinal Development of Punitive Damages in
Eighteenth-Century English Common Law ................................... 262
C. Distinguishing Exemplary from Aggravated Damages in EighteenthCentury English Common Law ...................................................... 265
D. Iniuria and Punitive Damages ....................................................... 267
1. Origins of the Notion of Iniuria ............................................... 268
2. The Reception of Iniuria into the English Common Law via Early
Development of Defamation.................................................... 269
E. Multiple Damages in Thirteenth-Century Statutes ........................ 273
1. Statute of Westminster I (1275) ............................................ 274
a. Trespass Against the Property or Goods of a Religious
House: Chapter 1 ......................................................... 275
b. Sheriffs’ or Other Local or Royal Officials’ Abuse of
Office:
Chapters 15, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32 .............................. 276
c. Causing Loss to Animals Taken in a Replevin Action:
Chapter 17.................................................................... 277
d. Barons or Bailiffs Committing Extortion Beyond Their
Jurisdiction: Chapter 35 .............................................. 278
2. Roman Law Influence on Thirteenth-Century
Statutes.................................................................................. 278
F. The Reception of Iniuria and Statutory Multiple Damages into the
Common Law................................................................................. 280
G. Early English Custom as an Unlikely Source of Multiple
Damages ........................................................................................ 286
H. The Emerging Crime-Tort Distinction Between the Anglo-Saxon
Period and the Late Thirteenth Century ........................................ 289
1. Anglo-Saxon Money Compositions as a Precursor to Crime and
Tort Laws................................................................................. 290
2. The Distinction Between Crime and Tort................................. 295
3. Iniuria as the Primary Influence on the Distinction Between Crime
and Tort law ............................................................................. 299
III. CONCLUSION: INIURIA AS THE COMMON THREAD ................................... 301
II.

INTRODUCTION
Compensation is the dominant remedy, if not the purpose, of modern tort law,
but fault still has a prominent place in many forms of wrongdoing. The concept of
fault is deeply rooted in English law’s comingling of tort and crime. Thus, the
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apparent anomaly of fault within the compensatory framework of modern tort law
can be reconciled by tracing the roots of fault to the doctrines that support both tort
and crime in English common law.1
Punitive, or exemplary, damages are an exception to the most fundamental
principle in the modern law of remedies that tort damages should restore the victim
to the pre-tort condition (restitutio in integrum).2 I will use the terms punitive
damages and exemplary damages interchangeably throughout this Article. Punitive
damages are used as a supplementary sanction in exceptional cases where
compensatory damages do not provide sufficient levels of deterrence and
retribution.3 Known by various names, including penal, retributory, or vindictive
damages, punitive damages are damages “over and above those necessary to
compensate the plaintiff.”4 Punitive damages are awarded for three main reasons: (1)
“to punish the defendant and provide retribution,” (2) “to act as a deterrent to the
defendant and others minded to behave in a similar way,” and (3) “ to demonstrate
the court’s disapproval of such conduct.”5 Punitive damages differ in purpose from
“aggravated damages.” Punitive damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoer,
whereas, aggravated damages “are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for increased
mental suffering due to the manner in which the defendant behaved in committing
the wrong or thereafter.”6
Punitive damages are anomalous and frequently criticized because the rationales
behind them lie in both tort and crime.7 A definitive history of punitive damages has
not yet been written to explain this anomaly. This Article aims to revisit the main
historical developments that are linked to the development of the doctrine of punitive
damages. This Article will formulate a longer meta-narrative that rejects linearity
and allows for historical contingency. This Article is a corrective to present
scholarship, which fails to adequately connect the historical moments that link
punitive damages to its roots in tort and crime.
Current scholarship begins the story of punitive damages in the classical period
of Roman law. From there, the story jumps to the newly emerging common law of
1 See Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 149-50 (Austl.)
(Windeyer J).
2

See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); Livingstone v.
Rawyards Coal Co. [1880] 5 App. Cas. 25 (HL) 39 (appeal taken from Scot.) (Lord
Blackburn); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[T]he
law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible
equivalent to his position prior to the tort.”).
3 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (explaining that
punitive damages as compared with compensatory damages “serve a broader function . . .
aimed at deterrence and retribution.”).
4 Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd v Sahin [2011] VSC 505, [43] (Austl.) (quoting Carter v
Walker [2010] VSCA 340, [284] (Austl.)).
5 HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH [1.7.1],
71 (4th ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
6

Id.

7 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (rev. ed. 2012); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 86-87 (2003).
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Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that revived Roman law and
then to the English statutes of the later thirteenth century. Finally, current
scholarship finishes the tale of punitive damages by citing the court cases of Wilkes
v. Wood and Huckle v. Money in 1763 that led to the “first explicit articulation” of
the legal principle of exemplary damages.8
This Article reveals that there is no overarching doctrinal unity in the
development of punitive damages, but rather a series of historical and doctrinal
circumstances that intersected to give rise to concepts recognizable as pre-modern
cognates of punitive damages. In discussing these issues, I can present only a few
selected texts, rather than a complete narrative. I am aware that, in treating some
topics, I only touch the surface of problems that would require a deeper and more
detailed analysis of the source material to provide a full-scale treatment of them.
Such treatment is unavoidable in pursuing a limited theme through a variety of
sources over a period of several centuries, and further analysis remains a task for this
author and others.
This Article begins with an outline of the current dilemma that Anglo-American
law perceives in the doctrine of punitive damages and how Anglo-American legal
history reflects this dilemma. This Article then analyzes three significant historical
moments. The first of these historical moments is the sensational litigation that
erupted after the 1763 publication of The North Briton, No. 45. This Article
examines the Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money cases heard before Lord Chief
Justice Pratt to illustrate the tension between judicial attempts to control doctrinal
development of the law of damages and the ostensibly uncontrolled role of juries in
awarding damages without recourse to such legal considerations.
This Article uses these eighteenth-century cases to suggest that the courts
awarded exemplary damages based on the Roman law concept of iniuria, which is
best translated as “affront to feelings” or “outrage.” The Article examines the
doctrinal development of the concept of iniuria from its classical Roman law origins
to its provenance in the Justinianic Roman law of the medieval West, and suggests
its reception in the English common law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
The second historical moment of note that is often cited as a pre-modern
analogue of exemplary damages is the late thirteenth-century English statutes that
provided for “multiple” damages. This section of the Article suggests that the
Roman law concept of iniuria played an influential role in late thirteenth-century
statutory drafting and the adoption of “multiple” damages.
The third historical moment often mentioned in the history of exemplary
damages is the Anglo-Saxon “money compositions.” The Article suggests that the
money compositions were part of a parallel narrative in which, by the end of the
thirteenth century, the common law began to discern a qualitative significance
between crime and tort.

8 Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; (1763) Lofft 1 (“[A] jury have it in
their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only
as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment . . . .”); Huckle v. Money
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769; 3 Wils. K.B. 205 (introducing the term “exemplary damages”
to explain an award that exceeded actual damage).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Punitive Damages Dilemma
The leading modern decision in the Anglo-American law of punitive damages is
the 1964 House of Lords’ decision, in particular the leading judgment of Lord
Devlin, in Rookes v. Barnard.9 In a seminal account of the origins and history of the
development of punitive damages, Lord Devlin, citing Street’s 1962 edition of
Principles of the Law of Damages, stated that punitives “originated just 200 years
ago in the cause célèbre of John Wilkes and The North Briton in which the legality
of a general warrant was successfully challenged.”10 Lord Devlin’s reference was to
the 1763 cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money.
Other common-law countries have also noted the origins of the concept of
punitive damages in Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money. The United States
Supreme Court cited Wilkes and two late eighteenth-century American cases for the
proposition that punitive damages have been a traditional part of state law.11 The
Australian High Court also acknowledged that Wilkes was the earliest authority to
use the term exemplary damages,12 but doubted whether its origins lay there.13
B. The Conflicting Policies Underlying the Punitive Damages Dilemma
In addition to its discussion of the historical origins of exemplary damages, Lord
Devlin and the House of Lords in Rookes reflected on the fundamental policy
dilemma inherent in punitive damages doctrine. After reviewing the authorities for
the case, Lord Devlin noted an anomaly: “when one examines the cases in which
large damages have been awarded for conduct of this sort, it is not at all easy to say
whether the idea of compensation or the idea of punishment has prevailed.”14
Lord Devlin continued, adding, “there are certain categories of cases in which an
award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength
of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law
a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.”15 His Lordship then
went on to define certain circumstances in which exemplary damages would be
available to a defendant. These categories were threefold: (1) “oppressive, arbitrary
9

Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).

10

Id. at 1221-22 (Lord Devlin) (quoting HARRY STREET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 28 (1962)). Elsewhere in that same textbook, the author referred to the role of the
Roman law notion of iniuria in damages, which I discuss later in this part.
11

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (citing Wilkes v. Wood (1763)
98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; (1763) Lofft 1; Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784); Coryell
v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)); id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing the nineteenthcentury text books published in the United States: THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 35 (4th ed. 1868); and GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 66 (1876)).
12

New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 648 (Austl.).

13

Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 152 (Austl.) (Windeyer J)
(noting that its origins occurred before 1763).
14

Rookes [1964] AC at 1221 (Lord Devlin).

15

Id. at 1226.
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or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government”; (2) where the
“defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which
may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff”; and (3) where
“exemplary damages are expressly authorised by statute.”16
Other common-law countries, however, have not taken such a confined and
categorical approach to awarding exemplary damages. In the United States,
exemplary damages are a well-settled principle of common law,17 but their
application differs from state to state, as exemplary damages are generally a matter
of state law. In many states, punitive damages are determined based on statute.
Whereas in other states, punitive damages may be determined based solely on case
law.18
In Australia, the High Court rejected the notion that awards of exemplary
damages could only occur if one of the three categories in Rookes were satisfied. In
actions for tort, according to the High Court, exemplary damages may be awarded
for any conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind, whether it fell within the three
categories or not.19 The principles were summarized in this way:
It seems from the award of damages that the jury took the view that
the publication of the libel in the first edition and again in the second was
in each case wanton conduct and had the colour of a contumelious
disregard of [the plaintiff’s] reputation both as a man and a member of
Parliament. The jury could only express their disapproval or “detestation”
(a word used by Pratt C.J. in Wilkes v. Wood) by awarding exemplary
damages. That is the purpose of exemplary damages. I think taking all the
circumstances of the case into consideration and the summing up, that the
jury were moved to punish the defendant in that way.20
The High Court downplayed the restrictive nature of Lord Devlin’s tripartite
categorization of exemplary damages, writing that “his Lordship was not purporting
to state any new principle. Nor was he stating one the application of which depended
upon the official position of the defendant; the principle was stated in general terms
as one which had application to a tortious act committed by any person.”21 In the
High Court’s view, the law relating to exemplary damages both in England and in
Australia was that exemplary damages might be awarded “if it appeared that, in the
16

Id. at 1226-27.

17

See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see
also Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 GA
L. REV. 409, 440-41 (2011).
18

See Perry, supra note 17, at 441-43.

19

Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 138 (Taylor J) (Austl.). The
United Kingdom Privy Council (as it was then the ultimate court of appeal) confirmed the
correctness of the High Court of Australia’s approach in this case under Australian law.
Australian Consol Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221 (PC) 241 (appeal taken from Austl.)
(Eng.). The Australian High Court was of the view that there was a reasonably clear concept
of exemplary damages in Australian law prior to Rookes, as set out in the previous Australian
High Court case of Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ) (Austl.).
20

Uren (1966) 117 CLR at 127 (McTiernan J) (Austl.).

21

Id. at 133 (Taylor J).
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commission of the wrong complained of, the conduct of the defendant had been
high-handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious or had in some other way exhibited a
contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.”22 The decision in Rookes, despite its
trenchant criticism by the Australian High Court,23 as well as other jurisdictions, was
subsequently upheld by a 4-3 majority of the House of Lords and thus remains the
law of England today.24
C. The Difference Between Aggravated and Punitive Damages
One further aspect of note in Lord Devlin’s seminal judgment in Rookes was its
attempt to distinguish punitive damages from aggravated damages. Lord Devlin
stated that the numerous epithets for punitive damages—“willful, wanton, highhanded, oppressive, malicious, outrageous”—were merely descriptive of the
circumstances of the case and were insufficient justification for punitive damages,25
he explained that punitive damages must be distinguished from the category of
aggravated damages, “in which injury to the plaintiff has been aggravated by malice
or by the manner of doing the injury, that is, the insolence or arrogance by which it is
accompanied.”26 While exemplary damages had a punitive element, aggravated
damages, in contrast, compensated the defendant for the aggravated nature of the
defendant’s conduct. Lord Devlin then declared: “This conclusion will, I hope,
remove from the law a source of confusion between aggravated and exemplary
damages which has troubled the learned commentators on the subject.”27
Thus, in the context of the Anglo-American law of punitive damages, the
decision in Rookes is significant in highlighting three matters of ongoing contention
and debate regarding punitive damages: (1) their origins in English legal history; (2)
the uncertainty of whether their philosophical or jurisprudential foundations lie in
criminal law or tort law and; (3) their conceptual differentiation and distinction from
aggravated damages. The purpose of this Article is to shed light on these issues by a
historical examination of the roots of punitive damages.
II. PUNITIVE OR COMPENSATORY? PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON TRIAL
A. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases and The Role of Juries and Judges in EighteenthCentury Damages Awards
The two seminal cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money are the first
explicit articulation of the doctrine of punitive damages. Lord Chief Justice Pratt
decided these cases on the legality of a series of arrests under general warrant
following the publication of the politically provocative pamphlet The North Briton,
No. 45 that was critical of King George III and his ministers. The following sections
22 Id. at 129; see also id. at 138 (“Exemplary damages are given only in cases of
conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights.”) (quoting Whitfield v
De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ)).
23

See id. at 138-39; see also Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 7-8 (Austl.).

24

Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] AC 1027 (HL) 1029 (appeal taken from Eng.).

25

Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 (HL) 1229 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from

Eng.).
26

Id.

27

Id. at 1230 (Lord Devlin).
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examine these cases and the principles expressed in them concerning punitive
damages.
The following sections further examine the importance, during the late eighteenth
century, of the respective roles of the jury, the judiciary, and practitioners in the
determination of damages awards that might be excessive. Any narrative of doctrinal
development must take into account the contingencies that unpredictable jury awards
might represent. I conclude this section, however, by observing the beginning of a
systematic approach to legal learning in the eighteenth century that paralleled this
apparently unimpeded jury power.
1. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases: Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money
In Wilkes v. Wood, Mr. Wilkes’s house was the subject of a search under a
general warrant of arrest, and he brought an action in trespass against the official
who executed the search.28 His counsel asked for “large and exemplary damages,”
since trivial damages would not put a stop to such proceedings.29 Lord Chief Justice
Pratt instructed the jury that “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the
injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action
itself.”30 Lord Devlin categorized this and another case under the first category of
oppressive conduct by servants of the government. The other case was Huckle v.
Money.
In Huckle, government messengers arrested and confined the printer of The
North Briton pamphlet for six hours on the orders of the Secretary of State.31
Although treated well, Huckle brought a suit alleging trespass, assault, and false
imprisonment against the official executing the warrant.32 The jury awarded a verdict
in favour of Huckle for £300 in damages.33 Lord Chief Justice Pratt, the presiding
judge, refused the application to set aside the jury verdict as excessive.34 Despite the
fact that actual damages amounted to £20 at most, His Lordship stated:
[I] think they [the court] have done right in giving exemplary damages.
To enter a man’s home by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to
procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under
which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring
public attack upon the liberty of the subject.35
Further, Pratt stated:

28

Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489; (1763) Lofft 1 (Lord Pratt CJ).

29

Id. at 490.

30

Id. at 498-99.

31

Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768; 3 Wils. K.B. 205.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 769.

35

Id.
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[P]erhaps £20 damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but
the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his
station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in
which the great points of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared
to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate all over the King’s subjects,
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to
destroy the liberty of the kingdom . . . .36
Wilkes and Huckle are cited as the paradigmatic exemplars of circumstances
when punitive damages might be awarded.37 Yet histories of punitive damages rarely
venture beyond these two cases. Nor do these cases explain that the precedents
discussed by Pratt LCJ in Wilkes and Huckle, and other cases of the time, occurred in
a context when juries had near-total control over damages awards.
2. The Role of Juries and Judges in Determining Damages Awards
It is important to understand the nature of jury verdicts awarding damages in the
context of the common law in the late eighteenth century. At this time, juries had
virtually carte blanche in awarding damages.38 From its classical form, the jury was a
group of twelve local people who knew the facts of the case and came to a
veredictum (lit. “truth-telling,” or verdict).39 There were, however, some checks and
balances put in place by the court to control the damages awards granted by juries.
The writ of attaint was the primary form of controlling a jury prior to the
eighteenth century.40 By 1202, the jury of attaint was a well-established procedure; it
was comprised of twenty-four knights who were summoned to form a grand jury to
review the verdict of a petty jury and to assess, on a re-trying of the evidence,
whether the original verdict was or was not “unjust.”41 The aim of this writ was to
prevent criminal abuse of the process of justice, specifically perjury by jurors. The
punishment for a false verdict was capital punishment.42
The application of attaint was originally confined to verdicts of assizes only.
Attaint expanded to all trespass actions in the thirteenth century, to land disputes in
the late thirteenth century, and to all pleas after 1360.43 The first use of attaint solely
36

Id. at 768-69.

37 See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) 1221-23 (appeal taken from Eng.). Lord
Devlin also cited a third case, Benson v. Frederick (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130; 3 Burr. 1845, in
which a soldier obtained damages of 150 pounds against his colonel who had ordered him to
be flogged “so as to vex a fellow officer.” Rookes [1964] AC at 1222-23. Lord Mansfield
acknowledged that the quantum of damages was beyond the actual harm suffered, but
nevertheless upheld the sum. See Benson, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. at 1130.
38 See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL
AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 66 (2006).

BY

JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT

AND

ANGLO-

39

Ralph V. Turner, The Origins of the Medieval English Jury: Frankish, English, or
Scandinavian? 7 J. BRIT. ST. no. 2, May 1968, at 3-4.
40 George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law (pt. 1), 47 L.Q. REV.
345, 346 (1931).
41

Id.

42

Id. at 347.

43

Id.
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on the basis of the erroneous assessment of damages was in the early thirteenth
century, in the forms of the “certifications” required of juries. That use, however, did
not persist beyond the fourteenth century.44 Later in the thirteenth century, the first
Statute of Westminster of 1275 permitted, as a matter of “grace,” a means of
reducing awards of damages if the amount was “outrageous” to the grand jurors and
the plaintiff was out of pocket as a result.45
The doctrine of attaint expanded in the fifteenth century. The court nisi prius (at
first instance) could question the jury and make a recommendation on the record of
matters within the court’s “certain knowledge” (conusans) that would lead to the full
court in banc at Westminster increasing the award.46 Only cases, such as battery or
mayhem (not so trespass to land and goods), could be matters of conusans, since the
court could review the evidence with its own eyes before entering judgment.47 By
the sixteenth century, the procedure of attaint was obsolete, and was formally
abolished in 1825.48
However, scholars have pointed out that juries were not entirely omnipotent. For
example, Richard Helmholz qualifies the notion that juries had a virtual carte
blanche in damages awards up to the eighteenth century.49 He argues that in slander
cases during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the judge’s
instructions to the jury and lawyers’ submissions to the jury as to the factors to be
taken into account in awarding damages played a significant role in the jury award.50
Furthermore, George T. Washington observes instances of judicial control over
awards in a number of non-slander instances before the mid-seventeenth century,
such as cases of debt, novel disseisin, detinue, and replevin.51
Helmholz notes, too, that by the sixteenth century, a motion “in arrest of
judgment” in a slander case provided a means for decreasing (remittitur) or,
possibly, increasing (addititur) the damages award of a jury.52 The procedure of
remittitur involved the plaintiff voluntarily forgiving the excessive component of the
damages award. In practice, the initiative to forgive excessive damages came by
means of persuasion from the judge refusing to enter judgment until such a
concession was made.53 This practice survived until 1622.54
44

Id. at 348.

45

Id. at 347, 349.

46

Id. at 354-55.

47

Id. at 355, 357.

48

See The Juries Act 1825, 6 Geo. 4 c. 50, § 60.

49

But see OLDHAM, supra note 38, at 66.

50 R. H. Helmholz, Damages in Actions for Slander at Common Law, 103 L.Q. Rev. 624,
624-29 (1987) [hereinafter Helmholz, Slander at Common Law].
51

Washington, supra note 40, at 351-53.

52

Helmholz, Slander at Common Law, supra note 50, at 629-35. See also J. H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 72-74 (2d ed. 1979), on the three forms of
motion for reviewing jury verdicts that existed by the sixteenth century, namely in arrest of
judgment, non obstante veredicto, and a new trial.
53

Helmholz, Slander at Common Law, supra note 50, at 630.
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3. The Shift in Power from Jury to Judge Under the Motion for New Trial
By far the most significant moment in shifting the balance of power from jury to
judge was the availability of the motion to order a new trial, which developed by the
late 1700s. As early as the 1590s, common-law courts granted new trials in
circumstances where juries violated procedural rules set up to control their “official
deportment.”55 But the procedure only fully took root in the second half of the
seventeenth century, no doubt a reaction by the common-law courts to the like
recourse that litigants had in the courts of equity.
The seminal decision was the 1655 decision of Wood v. Gunston, an “action of
trespass for words.”56 In this case, the defendant called the plaintiff a “traytor” and
the jury awarded £1,500 pounds in damages.57 The defendant’s counsel sought a new
trial on the basis that “it was a packed business else there could not have been such
great damages.”58 There is a difference of opinion on the significance of this case,
however. Some commentators note that this case marked the point at which a new
trial was granted “on the merits, as distinguished from the old practice of setting
aside a verdict for certain types of misconduct by the jury.”59 But near-contemporary
Pratt LCJ believed that this was on the basis of jury misconduct because there was
tampering with the jury (“a packed business”).60
Nevertheless, in the late 1600s and early 1700s, a more liberal attitude to
granting new trials prevailed. In 1726, there is an instance that signals a
determination of such matters “on discretion” in the case of Chambers v. Robinson.61
While the King’s Bench used its discretion to grant new trials in instances of
excessive jury verdicts on damages, the Court of Common Pleas adopted instead the
“rule of certainty,” which provided that it would only interfere with the decision at
first instance if there was certain evidence of error.62 Washington characterizes the
cases of the 1760s, such as Huckle and Beardmore v. Carrington, as instances of the
54 Hawkins v. Sciet (1622) 81 Eng. Rep. 1099; (1622) Palmer 314 (in which the court
declined to set aside a verdict of £150 for slander, resolving to “leave such matters of fact to
be found by the jury, who better understand [conusont] the quality and estate of the parties,
and the damages sustained”).
55

Washington, supra note 40, at 358.

56

Wood v. Gunston (1655) 82 Eng. Rep. 863, 867; (1655) Style 462.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59 Washington, supra note 40, at 362; see also William Renwick Riddell, New Trial at
Common Law, 26 YALE L.J. 49, 55 n.13 (1916).
60

Beardmore v. Carrington (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792; 2 Wils. K.B. 244 (Lord Pratt
CJ). Although the printed report by Wilson gives only a per curiam opinion, the first textbook
on damages by Joseph Sayer, written six years later, indicates that it was Pratt LCJ who spoke
for the court. See OLDHAM, supra note 38, at 66 (citing JOSEPH SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES
222-227 (2d ed. 1792) (1770)).
61
Chambers v. Robinson (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 787; 2 Strange 693 (Holt J) (granting a
new trial, stating, “it was but reasonable he [the defendant] should try another jury, before he
was finally charged”); see also Washington, supra note 40, at 363.
62

Washington, supra note 40, at 363.
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rule of certainty: “only in cases where the damages were certain as a matter of law
would a new trial be granted if the jury made an erroneous assessment.”63 In these
cases, the assessment was not a matter of law, but one for the jurors as
“constitutional judges” of the amount of recovery.64 By the end of the eighteenth
century, the position was that the Court of Common Pleas would not grant a new
trial in tort unless the amount given was so “monstrous and enormous” that all
mankind would blush.65 In contrast, the King’s Bench stated that it would exercise
its discretion in each case.66 The question of quantum of damages had by this time
become reviewable as a matter of law, and not just a question of fact for the jury.
But, if it was only in the eighteenth century that jury awards became subject to
“review” by the motion of seeking a new trial as a matter of law, was there any point
going back in time before this to investigate awards of exemplary or punitive
damages? As Mark Lunney states: “It is only in the eighteenth century that points
can be reserved from trial at nisi prius to be taken back to the court in banc [full
court, sitting at Westminster] and it is no surprise that most of the substantive law
begins from that period.”67 The answer, then, is an emphatic “yes.”
The reason to delve further into history is that the common-law courts in the
1760s, when looking to interpret the law on means of controlling damages verdicts
by juries, looked backwards in time rather than seeing themselves as at the beginning
of a new phase in this development (i.e., adopting the test of certainty). Evidence of
this lies in the first textbook on damages published by Sayer in 1770, who, despite
living through the changes that were taking place, had no presentiment of their
significance by privileging and citing authorities that focused on the “older law.”68
B. Possible Route of Doctrinal Development of Punitive Damages in EighteenthCentury English Common Law
Sayer’s textbook is worth investigating further for its development of doctrine on
exemplary damages, even though it is not the only example of regard to developed
precedent. Sayer’s textbook, The Law of Damages, published in 1770, was the first
63

Id. at 363.

64

Id.

65

Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793. But in applying this principle to the facts of the case,
Pratt LCJ stated:
[C]an we say that that 1000l. [pounds] are monstrous damages as against him, who
has granted an illegal warrant to a messenger who enters into a man’s house, and prys
into all his secret and private affairs, and carries him from his house and business, and
imprisons him for six days. It is an unlawful power assumed by a great minister of
State. Can any body state that a guinea per diem is sufficient damages in this
extraordinary case, which concerns the liberty of every one of the King’s subjects?
We cannot say the damages of 1000l. are enormous; and therefore the rule to shew
cause why a new trial should not be granted must be discharged.
Id. at 793-94.
66

Washington, supra note 40, at 364.

67

Private communication with the author, and on file.

68 George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law (pt. 2), 48 L.Q. REV. 90,
93 (1932).
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such text on damages.69 Sayer’s analysis mirrors that of Pratt LCJ’s judgment in
Beardmore, where a new trial was granted in cases where excessive damages were
awarded.70 Like Pratt LCJ, Sayer refers to Ash v. Ash71 and Chambers v. Robinson.72
In Ash, a new trial was permitted where a jury awarded the plaintiff £2,000 on a
count of false imprisonment by her mother for two or three hours.73 Holt CJ stated
that the jury’s power in awarding a verdict was not “absolute,” but was to come to its
finding with the assistance of the judge and “to give their reason for finding the
verdict as it is intended to be found, that if they proceeded upon a wrong notion they
may be set right.”74 In Chambers, Sayer reports that a new trial was granted after a
jury award of £1,000 for malicious prosecution was granted because the damages
were excessive, and that it was “fit that the defendant should try another jury” before
such an amount was imposed on the defendant.75 Unlike Sayer, Pratt LCJ rejected
both of these cases as representing sound rationales for overturning jury awards of
damages.76
Another line of inquiry is suggestive in providing a link between Pratt LCJ’s
awarding of punitive damages in the late eighteenth-century and the doctrinal
thinking that preceded it. This thinking is centered on the concept of awarding
“multiple damages” by statute. In his judgment in Beardmore, Pratt LCJ discloses
that he had recourse to medieval statutes and Year Books in discussing the law on
new trials being granted in cases of excessive verdicts in torts.77 Pratt LCJ indicates
that his search for authorities included the Year Books of the mid 1300s and 1400s,
in which courts did not grant new trials, but instead decreased or increased the

69 JOSEPH SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2d ed. 1792) (1770). Although a textbook is not
necessarily conclusive evidence of legal doctrine and practice in its contemporaneous context,
it nevertheless provides contemporary evidence of directions in legal thought. More so, it is
difficult to ignore in the absence of other contrary contemporaneous evidence.
70

Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793.

71

(1701) 90 Eng. Rep. 526; (1701) Comberbach 357.

72

(1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 787; 2 Strange 691; see also SAYER, supra note 69, at 215-16.

73

Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. at 526.

74

SAYER, supra note 69, at 216.

75

Id.

76

Pratt LCJ read Wood v. Gunston not as demonstrating the authority of a court to order a
new trial in the case of excessive damages but instead showing that this could be done in
instances only of jury misbehavior. The overturning of the jury award in the case of Ash v.
Ash, according to Pratt LCJ, was “plainly for the misdemeanor of the jury in refusing to
answer the Judge when he asked what ground or reason they went upon.” Beardmore v.
Carrington (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792; 2 Wils. K.B. 244. In the case of Chambers v.
Robinson, Pratt LCJ said it was the “only case where ever a new trial was granted merely for
the excessiveness of damages only,” but disagreed with the rationale of that decision, namely
that of giving the defendant “a chance of another jury . . . and would be a reason for a third
and fourth trial, and would be digging up by the constitution by the roots; and therefore we are
free to say that this case is not law.” Id. at 792.
77

Id.
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damages award themselves “upon view of plaintiff’s mayhem78 and identifying his
person,” that is, after viewing the wronged plaintiff and seeing the impact of the
tort.79
Pratt LCJ was not alone in this recourse to medieval authorities, particularly
statute books. The text book writer, Sayer, delved back as far as the 1400s in a
chapter entitled “Of Double and Treble Damages,” where, against the general rule
that “single damages [only were] recoverable,” he observed that double, or treble,
damages were given “by particular statutes.”80 These included statues from: 1689,
which provided for multiple damages in cases of breach of the process of distraint;81
1429 in cases of forcible entry;82 and 1601 for an action in trespass against an
overseer of the poor brought in 1755.83
78

The offense of mayhem at the time of Bracton was defined as an aggravated act that
incapacitated a man from fighting. See Graham McBain, Modernising the Common Law
Offences of Assault and Battery, 4 INT’L L. RES. 1, 53 (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ilr.v4n1p39.
79

Pratt LCJ referred to cases from 1348 on battery; 1401 and 1405 on conspiracy; 1407,
where damages were not increased despite the Justice of Nisi Prius considering them too low
without “seeing the mayhem”; 1430 on debt, in which the court increased the damages
amount. His Lordship concluded:
From these ancient cases it was argued, that Courts of Justice have in all times
considered themselves authorized to review the damages given by juries in all kinds of
actions, and either to abridge or increase them; and since that practice has been
disused, and abridging damages by the Court has been looked upon as
unconstitutional, new trials have been granted for excessive damages.
Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 792.
80

SAYER, supra note 69, at 242-43.

81 Id. at 243-45; see also 2 W. & M. c. 5, in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 169-70 (reprt. ed.
1963). Chapter 5 enables the sale of goods that have been distrained for rent where the rent
has not been paid on time, providing five days elapse from the time notice is given. Id.
Paragraph 3, however, allows the person whose goods are distrained for the rent to recover
“their Treble Damages and Costs of Suite against the Offender” in any “Rescous or PoundBreach.” Id. Further, section 4 provides that the person whose goods are distrained may
“recover double the value of the goods” in an action of trespass on the case “where in truth
noe Rent is arreare or due.” Id.
82 8 Hen. 6 c. 9, in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 246 (reprt. ed. 1963). Chapter 9 provides a
recital of 15 Rich. 2 c. 2 against forcible entry and permitting the assize of novel disseisin,
including the provision that a plaintiff successful in recovering their land under the assize of
novel disseisin “shall recover his Treble Damages against the Defendant” in cases where the
defendant “entered with Force into the Lands and Tenements, or them after his Entry did hold
with Force.” 8 Hen. 6 c. 9.
83 43 Eliz. 1 c. 2, § 18, in 4(2) STATUTES OF THE REALM 965 (reprt. ed. 1963). Chapter 2,
section 18 provides that a plaintiff who brings an action of trespass against a defendant who
purports to distrain or sell the plaintiff’s property for the purposes of this statute shall proceed
in the normal way to trial by jury, requiring the defendant to avow their justification for the
use of the property. In the event that the defendant is successful, “the same Defendant to
recover Treble Damages, by reason of his wrongfull vexacion in that behalfe, with his Costs
also in that same parte susteyned, and also that to be assessed by the same Jurie or Writ to
inquire of the Damages, as the same shall require.” Id.
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In addition to Sayer’s list, there were other statutes giving rise to multiple
damages, and which judges, lawyers, and legal writers of the eighteenth century may
have known. Section 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) provided that an officer’s
failure to deliver the charged person within the required time meant “for the first
offence forfeit to the prisoner or party grieved the sum of one hundred pounds; and
for the second offence the sum of two hundred pounds.”84 The Statute of Monopolies
(1624), moved by Sir Edward Coke, provided for the limiting of Crown-granted
monopolies under pain of triple damages to those aggrieved by seizure of their goods
or chattels “by occasion or pretexts of any Monopolies.”85 These laws indicate that
the notion of multiple damages was known to common lawyers of the eighteenth
century in the form of statutes from as early as the 1270s and 1420s that still
operated to exact double or treble damages for certain forms of wrongdoing.
C. Distinguishing Exemplary from Aggravated Damages in Eighteenth-Century
English Common Law
One conceptual difficulty that emerges in examining these cases from the 1760s
is the lack of a clear differentiation between excessive awards on the basis of
punitive damages and those based on aggravated damages. Especially in cases of
slander, as the courts have noted in modern times, there is likely to be considerable
overlap between aggravated damages and punitive damages. This was so in the
context of the cases in the 1760s.
Alongside the cases just discussed concerning publication of The North Briton,
No. 45, there were other cases in which juries awarded large verdicts for mental
suffering, wounded dignity, and injured feelings—in other words, for aggravated
damages. These circumstances also include seduction, as in the 1769 case of
Tullidge v. Wade, involving the action for loss of a daughter’s services, and, as noted
by Justice Bathurst, “the circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult
is given, require different damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the
Royal Exchange, than in a private room.”86 Paul Mitchell cites Tullidge as an
example of eighteenth-century courts taking inspiration from the Roman law concept
of iniuria to award exemplary damages, as discussed further below.87
Paul Mitchell’s historical analysis examines factors that could increase damage
awards apart from special damage. He begins with the general principle stated by
Pratt LCJ in Huckle that the “state, degree, quality, trade or profession of the party
injured, as well of the person who did the injury, must be, and generally are,
considered by the jury in giving damages.”88 Malice could evince an improper
motive that made it worse. In explaining the relevance of malice to damages in
nineteenth-century case law, Mitchell posits
84

31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 5, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 936 (reprt. ed. 1963); see also 31 Car.
2 c. 1, § 16, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 929 (reprt. ed. 1963) (referring to payment of
“Treble Damages” by a party offending the Act); 31 Car. 2 c. 1, § 31, in 5 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 934 (reprt. ed. 1963) (referring to defendants being able to “recover their treble Costs”
if a suit against him or her does not succeed).
85

21 Jac. 1 c. 3, § 4, in 4(2) STATUTES OF THE REALM 1212 (reprt. ed. 1963).

86

Tullidge v. Wade (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909; 3 Wils. K.B. 18.

87

PAUL MITCHELL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN LAW OF DEFAMATION 66-67 (2005).

88

Id. at 64 (quoting Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768; 2 Wils. K.B. 205).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

15

266

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:251

an approach to compensation different to the one we are familiar with
today . . . . [This approach] awarded damages for loss and to mark the fact
that the claimant had suffered a wrong. “Injury” . . . was not a synonym
for loss. It was both the wrong and its consequences.89
Mitchell identified a trend towards awarding damages taking into account both
the actual loss and the method of inflicting the damage, including malice. He cites
two cases by way of example.
In the first case, Sears v. Lyons, in 1818, the defendant deliberately scattered
poisoned barley on the plaintiff’s land in order to kill his poultry.90 The judge
directed the jury to consider the motive in awarding something beyond mere
pecuniary damages.91 The second case, from 1814, Merest v. Harvey, involved a
drunk and wealthy defendant who threatened the plaintiff with legal action through
his office as a magistrate if he refused him the right to shoot on the plaintiff’s land.92
The plaintiff received an enormous award of damages (500 pounds), and the Court
of King’s Bench refused to set it aside as excessive.93 Was this to compensate for
injured feelings (aggravated damages) or to make an example of the defendant’s
poor conduct (exemplary damages)? Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Heath in Merest
suggested that such an award “goes to prevent the practice of dueling, if juries are
permitted to punish by exemplary damages,” thus indicating the latter.94
The notion of malice is a factor that might increase damages beyond the actual
harm suffered. But is it to be considered as part of the circumstances relevant to
aggravated damages, namely those damages payable because of the aggravated
nature of the circumstances in which the wrongdoer carries out the wrongdoing? Or,
is malice part of the contempt shown to the victim and therefore part of exemplary
damages? In 1770, the Court of Common Pleas in Bruce v. Rawlins reflected this
uncertainty.95 In that case, customs officers entered the plaintiff’s house to search for
goods on which they suspected no customs dues had been paid.96 Despite a search,
the officers found none.97 The jury awarded plaintiff £100 in damages, which the
court refused to interfere with on a writ of inquiry.98
The three judges differed on their grounds for refusing the writ. Chief Justice
Wilmot focused on the conduct of the customs officers and the injury to the
plaintiff’s reputation.99 This line of reasoning follows the Huckle and Wilkes
89

Id. at 65.

90

Sears v. Lyons (1818) 171 Eng. Rep. 658; 2 Stark 317.

91

Id.

92

Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761; 5 Taunt 442.

93

Id. at 761.

94

Id. at 761 (Gibbs CJ & Heath J).

95

Bruce v. Rawlins (1770) 95 Eng. Rep. 934; 3 Wils. K.B. 61.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 934-35.

99

Id. at 934 (Wilmot CJ).
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decisions, implying that exemplary, not aggravated, damages are relevant in Bruce.
Justice Yates is more explicit in articulating exemplary damages as the basis of the
jury award, following the reasoning in Beardmore that the “case must be very gross,
and the damages enormous” for the award to be disturbed.100 Justice Gould, on the
other hand, specifically notes that the defendant’s conduct in “entering the plaintiff’s
house under colour of legal authority, aggravates the trespass.”101 It is pertinent to
note, that these early cases demonstrate some slipperiness in clearly identifying
earlier lineages of concepts of exemplary damages and must be treated with caution.
D. Iniuria and Punitive Damages
The slippery distinction between exemplary damages and aggravated damages in
these early cases prior to their explicit differentiation in Rookes, nevertheless reflects
the existence of an underlying notion to award damages beyond mere compensatory
purposes and to award damages, additionally, for some further hurt to the victim by
the very nature of the wrongdoer’s conduct. Pre-modern cognates to this intuited, yet
difficult to articulate concept, lie in the Roman law notion of iniuria.
In its essence, iniuria is the antonym of ius (law or right). That is to say, it
denotes simply unlawfulness or the absence of a right.102 As the name of a particular
delict in Roman law, this may be rendered in English by the word “insult” or
“outrage,” although the full width of the Roman idea included “any contumelious
disregard of another’s rights of personality.”103 It thus included not merely physical
assaults and oral or written assaults and abuse, but any affront to another’s dignity or
reputation and any disregard of another’s public or private rights, provided always
that the act was done wilfully and with contumelious intent.104 The applicable
penalty for the delict of iniuria, therefore, reflected the nature of the delict itself in
not simply awarding compensation for actual harm suffered, but for the additional
contumely suffered.
Paul Mitchell has noted the provenance of the concept of iniuria in common-law
cases of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as discussed above.105 He notes
factors that could be “taken into account to increase damages” in Huckle, and
demonstrations of this in the nineteenth-century cases Sears and Merest.106 Mitchell
expands further on the notion of iniuria, when he notes that in Merest the presiding
judge cited an example of how, if the recovery for trespass were limited to pecuniary
damage, a man might repeatedly commit a trespass in a most invasive and offensive
manner, but only give the claimant a halfpenny damages to settle his legal
liability.107 This example, Mitchell observes, is “suspiciously similar” to a problem
discussed in the Roman texts of a man, knowing that damages for iniuria were fixed,
100

Id. at 935 (Yates J).

101

Id. (Gould J).

102

BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 216 (reprt. 1982).

103

Id.

104

Id. at 215-16.

105

MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 65-67.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 66.
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going around slapping people’s faces and then instructing his slave to hand over the
fixed payment.108
A second example examined by Mitchell is the earlier 1769 case of Tullidge,
involving the action for loss of a daughter’s services.109 Bathurst J noted that “the
circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require
different damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange,
than in a private room.”110 This is compared with Justinian’s Institutes 4.4.9, in
which one of the factors said to make an affront more serious is “the place where it is
committed, e.g., whether the affront were perpetrated in the theatre or in the market
place.”111 Mitchell dismisses the call for the common law to follow the Roman law
of iniuria on such matters,112 claiming that the common law already heeded the call
in the eighteenth century, as demonstrated in the cases just discussed.113 In this
regard, he notes that the High Court of Australia has borrowed the vocabulary from
Roman law roots of punitive damages, approving the test that there must be a case of
“conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights.”114 The
following section attempts provide what Mitchell does not: A historical lineage by
which the concept of iniuria was received into the English common law.
1. Origins of the Notion of Iniuria
In classical Roman law, iniuria in general meant simply omne quod non iure fit
(“everything that is not lawful”).115 As a special delict, however, it meant
contumelia, insult or outrage.116 Based on outraged feelings rather than on economic
loss, the actio iniuriarum was, as Buckland noted, vindictam spirans.117 The money
108 Id.; see also JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 217 (2006) (clarifying that this story dates from the third
century and was recorded in AULUS GELLIUS, NOCTES ATTICAE 20.1 (Albert Lion ed. 1825)).
109

Tullidge v. Wade (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909; 3 Wils. K.B. 18.

110

Id. at 910 (Bathurst J).

111

MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 67; cf. G. INST. 3.220 (F. de Zulueta trans., 1946).

112

See Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect, 32 IRISH
JURIST 1, 10 (1997).
113

MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 67.

114

Id. (quoting Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ) (Austl.)).
Mitchell suggests that the phrase “contumelious” was taken from a passage in Salmond’s 1920
edition of his textbook on torts, where he discussed the Roman approach to compensation for
insult, in which the Latin term contumelia (“contempt”) was used to describe the kind of
conduct that was actionable. Id. (discussing JOHN W. SALMOND, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 129 (5th ed. 1920)). But Knox CJ in his judgment makes no mention of this textbook.
See Whitfield, 29 CLR at 77 (Knox CJ).
115 John S. Beckerman, Adding Insult to Iniuria: Affronts to Honor and the Origins of
Trespass, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SAMUEL E.
THORNE 159, 176-77 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981); see also J. INST. 4.4.7 (Peter Birks &
Grant McLeod trans., 1987).
116

W. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK
(1921).
117

OF

ROMAN LAW

FROM

AUGUSTUS

TO JUSTINIAN

584

Id. at 586.
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payment sought represented “solace for injured feelings or affronted dignity,” not
compensation for economic loss.118 A wide variety of wrongs came to be
encompassed by the actio iniuriarum, related by the fact that they showed contempt
of the victim’s personality or tended to disparage him, or were intended to do so.119
The delict of iniuria has its origins in Gaius’s Institutes 3.220, describing an
iniuria as committed when a person is struck, vocally attacked, or subject to
defamatory conduct, including writing, sexual harassment, and miscellaneous other
examples.120 Peter Birks, similarly, argues that the delict iniuria protected “one’s fair
share of respect.”121 Birks summarized the delict of iniuria as comprising four
elements: (1) an act of harassment, in its broad meaning, (iniuria) by the tortfeasor;
(2) carried out by the tortfeasor with contempt; (3) typically causing harm to the
victim in the nature of “anger and humiliation (the desire for revenge, joined with
grief)”; and (4) violating “the victim’s right to his or her proper share of respect.”122
An important rider attaches to the delict, namely that the tortfeasor’s conduct be
iniuria, i.e., non-iure, not lawful or “unlawful.”123
This Praetorian remedy was for what we would call damages, although the
essence of the delict was not economic loss but insult. Therefore, the money
payment must usually have represented not compensation in the ordinary sense, but
rather solace for injured feelings or affronted dignity.124 Barry Nicholas narrates the
development of this Praetorian remedy, based on the story related by Mitchell, when
the fall in the value of money deprived the fixed penalties in the Twelve Tables of
their efficacy: a Roman followed by his slave with a purse went about slapping the
faces of respectable persons and bidding the slave to tender to each the statutory
penalty.125 This, we are told, drove the Praetors to intervene,126 which they did by
providing an action not for a fixed penalty, but for damages at large.127
2. The Reception of Iniuria into the English Common Law via Early Development
of Defamation
By the time of Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, Roman law was compiled
into the Corpus Iuris Civilis. This body of law, which attempted to codify and
abridge the sources of law from the “classical period” of Roman law, including
118

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 217.

119

BUCKLAND, supra note 116, at 585.

120

On the delict of iniuria, see G. INST., supra note 111, at 3.220; see also DIG. 47.10; J.
INST., supra note 115, at 4.4; CODE JUST. 9.35 (Diocletian & Maximian 290); J. A. C. THOMAS,
TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 369-72 (1976); NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216.
121

Birks, supra note 112, at 10.

122

Id. at 7-11.

123

Id. at 11.

124

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 217.

125

Id. at 216-17.

126

DIG. 47.10.15.26 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 67).

127

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216-17; see also Peter B. H. Birks, The Early History of
Iniuria, 37 LEGAL HIST. REV. 163, 174-175 (1969) (discussing this story of Lucius Veratius as
reported by Gellius and attributed to Labeo).
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Gaius’s Institutes, forbade reference to the earlier law.128 The renewed study of
Justinianic Roman law, after more than half a millennium of neglect, occurred in the
1100s in Bologna, Italy.129 This was Roman law according to the Justinian
compilations of ancient text-writers, rather than the ancient texts of the jurists
themselves.130 Justinian’s Institutes 4.4 (De iniuriis), heavily reliant on Gaius’s
earlier text, emphasized that the notion of contempt rendered the iniuria
actionable.131 Although it did not form a coherent body of doctrine identifiable with
the modern descendants of defamation, it stated that, “anyone who shall formulate a
writing or slanderous words publicly against the reputation of another, if he does not
prove the writing, shall be whipped.”132
The precursor to the action of defamation was the action on the case for words,
which emerged in the sixteenth century.133 Prior to this time, actions for harmful
words were dealt with under two canon law “regimes.”134 One of these regimes was
based on the texts from the Decretum and Justinian’s Institutes, and the related
canonistic commentary that emerged after 1140,135 namely the canon law collections
the Decretals (1234) of Gregory IX, also called the Liber Extra, the Liber Sextus
(1298), issued by Boniface VIII, and the commentaries on these texts.136 The other
was the 1222 statute Auctoritate dei patris, a provincial constitution that
excommunicated any person who maliciously imputed another of a crime.137 The
influence of the earlier canon law on the drafting of the provisions of the statute that
took place at the Council of Oxford statute is “quite possible,” according to
128 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 6-7 (3d ed. 2007); see
also NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 42-43.
129

ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 149 (2000).

130

But the texts within the Justinianic corpus itself were received into medieval Western
Europe in the twelfth century at different times and in variants, for example the Florentina
and the Vulgata manuscripts of the Digest. See Harry Dondorp & Elto J. H. Schrage, The
Sources of Medieval Learned Law, in THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO
REGULA 7, 13-15 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2010).
131

J. INST., supra note 115, at 4.4.6 (“nisi in contumeliam tuam pulsatus sit, tunc enim
competit et tibi iniuriarum actio.”).
132 R. H. HELMHOLZ, SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600 xvii (1985) [hereinafter
HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION] (quoting C.5 q.1 c.1) (translating “[q]ui in alterius famam publice
scripturam aut uerba contumeliosa confinxerit, et repertus scripta non probauerit, flagelletur”).
133

See 1 R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE CANON
LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640S 572, 590 (2004) [hereinafter
HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY]; see also Van Vechten Veeder, The History of the Law of
Defamation, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 446, 448 (John Henry
Wigmore et al. eds., 1909); Frank Carr, The English Law of Defamation (pt. 2), 18 L.Q. REV.
388, 393 (1902); Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the Common Law, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1962).
134

HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 133, at 562-72.

135

Id. at 567-72.

136

Id. at 94.

137

Id. at 572.
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Helmholz.138 This is more likely given that a church council convoked by the
Archbishop of Canterbury Stephen Langton, a man deeply learned in canon law,
passed the statute.139
This statute provided a narrower ground of action than, and was independent of,
the grounds in the Decretum. It did not replace the earlier canon law principles, but
sharpened them. The canon law texts and commentaries adopted the Roman law
concept of iniuria as one of the ways a person might be injured, through contumelia
(hurting the feelings of others), while the statute of Auctoritate dei patris confined
itself strictly to the imputation of crime.140
One prominent canon law commentator, Hostiensis, observed that the English
ecclesiastical courts were merely fulfilling the supplementary role enjoined on them
by canon law in the Liber Extra.141 Helmholz supports this by noting the operation of
the two schemas in complementary ways, as evidenced by proof of maliciose, or
malice, by the person making the imputation of crime under the statute.142 Although
this involved subjective questions of motive, this malice might be constructively
imputed from the nature of the words without proof of actual malice. Non-canon law
legal sources also support the existence of intentionality in inuria. The Ordinary
Gloss to one of the relevant titles in the Code dealing with iniuria (De iniuriis)
provided for a presumption that the defendant intended iniuria where certain words
were used that gave rise to a necessary implication of it.143 Received principles on a
judge’s discretion to make a finding of iniuria in Roman law also had application in
this context for attributing the appropriate motive of malice.144
In practice, plaintiffs litigated actions for words in the ecclesiastical courts,
although some were heard in the criminal courts. This trend reversed around 1500,
when secular and royal courts experienced a revival in the number of defamation
cases in their jurisdictions.145 The reversal was brought about by a series of actions
in the early 1500s that heightened the jurisdictional demarcation between the two
spheres.
This jurisdictional separation was on the basis of the underlying wrongdoing
being either secular or ecclesiastical. Thus, the Church was restricted to entertaining
defamation cases only when the underlying matter was wholly spiritual.146 There is
evidence that this demarcation may have occurred in practice by the last two decades

138

HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xvii.

139

HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 133, at 133.

140

HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xix.

141

Id. at xix n.1 (citing HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA AD X 2.2.11 (Ex tenore), no. 9).

142

Id. at xxxii.

143

Id. at xxxii n.4 (citing GLOSSA ORDINARIA AD CODEX 9.35.5 (Si non convicii) s.v.
probare potes); LYNDWOOD, PROVINCIALE, 263 s.v. iniuriose)).
144 Id. at xxxii n.5 (citing DURANTIS, SPECULUM IUDICIALE, IV, tit. De iniuriis et damno
dato, § Scias s.v. concipitur).
145

Id. at xliii-xlv.

146 This was how the courts interpreted the Statute of Praemunire, 16 Ric. 2 c. 5. See
HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xliii.
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of the fifteenth century or as early as the fourteenth century.147 Although this
resulted in a loss of litigation by the ecclesiastical courts to the secular courts, it did
not spell the demise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over actions for words altogether,
and litigation increased, or at least remained steady, in that sphere in the end of the
sixteenth century.
Despite this revival of the secular courts, prior influences remained. The forms of
pleading used were borrowed from pre-1500 forms used in respect of the Auctoritate
dei patris statute, while several cases from the early 1500s show evidence of
pleadings that were copied from an ecclesiastical formulary, or precedent book.148
This was accompanied by one important development in the form of pleading at
canon law that was quite separate from the Auctoritate dei patris: that any convicium
(vocal attack) tending to the diminution of the good fame or status of the plaintiff
could be punishable by ecclesiastical sanctions.149 This put the ecclesiastical courts
“in the position of enforcing something like the actio iniuriarum of Roman law
adopted by medieval canonists.”150
In the local courts, defamation causes were treated the same way as physical
actions, namely as trespasses, thus treating slander as one of the many ways iniuria
might occur. This is evident in several matters in which a plaintiffs’ pleadings set out
the damages in precisely the formula of the actio iniuriarum.151 The secular courts
provided no remedy at all to the early cases of defamation, while the ecclesiastical
courts provided the penalty of excommunication.152
This changed when the secular courts experienced a revival in the number of
defamation cases they heard after 1500 and began to offer successful claimants
monetary damages.153 In fact, a plaintiff did not have to prove actual loss suffered
but merely the utterance of certain words, which, once proven to be spoken, raised a
presumption that loss had been suffered.154 The case was then left to the jury to
ascertain the amount of that loss.155 As discussed, the jury had a great deal of
independence in awarding damages, but were under some restrictions.156 Introducing
iniuria as an underlying justification for damages awards ameliorates the difficulty
of ascertaining legal doctrine in the context of questions of fact concerning damages
awards by juries. So, while the sixteenth century witnessed an upsurge in action on
the case litigation being heard in royal courts, this did not mean its cessation in
ecclesiastical courts. In fact, the two canon law schemas, dealing with actions for
147 HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xliii n.6 (citing Case of the Abbot of St.
Alban’s, Y. B. Trin. 22 Edw. IV (1482), f. 20, pl. 47); see also id. at xlvii-xlix.
148

Id. at lxxii.

149

Id.

150

Id. at xlvi.

151

Id. at li, lii, lxv.

152

Id. at xiv, lxviii.

153

MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 53.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

See supra Part I.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/8

22

2016]

THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT COMMON LAW

273

words, continued to develop doctrinally based on the Roman law notion of iniuria.
This concept informed local courts in their treatment of defamation matters. Thus,
the link between the law of proto-defamation under the canon law texts and the
statute Auctoritate dei patris with the notion of iniuria continued well beyond the
thirteenth century.157
The influence of Roman iniuria must be considered alongside the related
phenomenon of “multiple” damages. The iniuria action in Roman law was not for a
fixed penalty, but for damages at large.158 This delictual action was classified as
penal (ad poenam persequendam), meaning it commonly resulted in the payment of
more than compensation. This was in contrast to all other delictual actions, whether
in rem or in personam, which were ad rem persequendam, meaning they commonly
resulted in the payment of compensation only.159
E. Multiple Damages in Thirteenth-Century Statutes
The main lines of debate in tracing the lineage of exemplary damages in legal
history are indebted to the account of the incomparable Frederic William Maitland.
On the phenomenon of exemplary damages in his seminal History of the English
Law in chapter 8 on crime and tort, Maitland notes that it was “a favourite device” of
legislators during the reign of King Edward I of “giving double or treble damages to
‘the party [ag]grieved’. . . it took the form of manyfold reparation, or penal and
exemplary damages.”160 The footnote to this passage makes reference to provisions
from three thirteenth-century statutes.
The first is the “double damages” provision appearing in “a crude form” in the
Statute of Merton states that if a male ward marries without the lord’s consent, the
lord may hold the land for an additional period so as to obtain twice the value of that
of which he has been deprived.161 The marriage gift or “marriage portion” was given
with the bride, usually to the groom’s lord in the case of a ward, or the groom’s
family in the case of non-ward.162 Second, is the Statute of Westminster I in which
157 Ironically, as Beckerman has noted, by the time of this “receiving” of the doctrine of
defamation into the common law in the sixteenth century as the action on the case for words,
tort liability in trespass and case had long excluded solace for injured feelings (solatium) or
pecuniary retribution for affronted honor, both inherent in the notion of iniuria. Beckerman,
supra note 115, at 181. He therefore argues that the common-law remedies for libel and
slander after the sixteenth century developed with a much different jurisprudential framework
from the Roman actio iniuriarum. Id.
158

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216-17.

159

Id. at 210.

160 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 522 (2d ed. 1968).

OF THE

161

Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3 c. 6, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1, 3 (reprt. ed. 1963)
(duplice valore maritagii). On the limitations of the translations and editions of the statutes in
this work, see generally THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (reprt. ed. 2013). Note that Chapter 6 provides
the sole relief to the plaintiff lord; there is no additional measure of fine, amercement, or
imprisonment by the King, unlike some of the other provisions discussed below.
162

For more information on the maritagium, see BAKER, supra note 52, at 310-11; 2 JOHN
HUDSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 871-1216, 787-91 (2012). See also
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED
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“double or treble damages are lavishly distributed.”163 These provisions will be
further discussed below.164 The third example is of “heavy punishment inflicted on a
civil action” from the Statute of Westminster II: An action for “ravishment of ward”
may lead to the perpetual imprisonment of the defendant if he does not pay for the
maritagium.165 Also relevant to the three statutes mentioned by Maitland, is a fourth
statute, the Statute of Gloucester, which awarded treble damages for “waste.”166
Thus, a key moment in tracing the origins of punitive damages is the thirteenthcentury statutes, all of which provided for multiple “damages” in certain cases of
wrongdoing.
1. Statute of Westminster I (1275)
The multiple damages provisions in the First Statute of Westminster are indeed
“lavish.”167 The multiple damages provisions in the earlier Statute of Merton and the
later Second Statute of Westminster both relate to the phenomenon of maritagium,
while the Statute of Gloucester’s reference to such damages is in regard to waste.168
Those in the first Statute of Westminster of 1275, however, relate to a much wider
range of wrongdoing.
The statute was drafted during the reign of King Edward I, shortly after his return
from the Ninth Crusade and coronation the year before. His first Parliament met on
April 22, 1275 at Westminster; its main work was the consideration of the Statute of
Westminster I. This was drawn up, not in Latin, but in Norman French, and was
passed “par le assentement des erceveskes, eveskes, abbes, priurs, contes, barons, et
la communaute de la tere ileokes somons.”169 Burnell may have played a leading role

GLANVILL 138 (G.D.G. Hall ed., trans., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GLANVILL] (the “reasonable
share” or rationabilis partum); 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 77 n.21
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) [hereinafter BRACTON].
163 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522; Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw.
I, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 26 (reprt. ed. 1963).
164

See infra Part II.E.1.

165

Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 35, in 1 STATUTES OF
(reprt. ed. 1963); see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522 n.1.

THE

REALM 88

166

Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw. 1 c. 5, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 48 (reprt. ed.
1963). “Waste” was the substantial destruction or cutting down of “forests, woods, or any
thickets suitable as food or lair.” HUDSON, supra note 162, at 409 (quoting RICHARD
FITZNIGEL, DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO: THE DIALOGUE OF THE EXCHEQUER 92 (Emile Amt &
S.D. Church eds., trans., 2007)).
167

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522.

168

See id. at 522. Compare Statute of Westminster 1285, 13 Edw. 1, in 1 THE STATUTES OF
of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw. 1, in 1 THE

THE REALM, supra note 168, at 88, with Statute
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 169, at 48.

169 SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 450 (William Stubbs, ed., 6th
ed., 1874).
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in this legislation, since he held the office of chancellor from September 21, 1274
until his death in 1292, and his influence on the King well attested.170
Ten provisions of this statute refer to multiple damages. It is convenient to divide
the possible damages into four categories based on the offense: (1) trespass against
the property or goods of a religious house; (2) abuse of office by sheriffs or other
local or royal officials; (3) causing loss to animals taken in a replevin action; and (4)
extortion by barons or bailiffs beyond their jurisdiction.
a. Trespass Against the Property or Goods of a Religious House: Chapter 1
Chapter 1 of the Statute of Westminster I sought to prevent the abuse by
uninvited guests of the charity, and welcome them as visitors to religious houses. It
expresses the concept of the “peace of the Church,” which was being disturbed at
this point in time.171 It provides that religious houses need not provide food,
lodgings, or anything else to uninvited visitors unless the visitor was in dire need or
the religious house agreed to provide something. Chapter 1 makes it an actionable
trespass against those who cause any “door, lock, nor window, nor nothing that is
shut, to be opened or broken” in a religious house, or to take away any goods or food
from that religious house without consent of that house.172
If the trespasser fails to pay compensation for the damage, that trespasser will be
imprisoned by the king and fined “according to the quantity and manner of the
trespass, and after as the king in his Court may think convenient.”173 Significantly, if
the religious house sues for the trespass, “damages will be awarded to them, and they
shall be awarded and restored to the double.”174 Further, following annual inquests
by the king into such trespasses, those indicted must appear in the King’s Court.175
Failure to do so made them “atteinted” and required “double damages” at the king’s
suit to those who suffered damage, as well as a grievous fine. The extra fine

170

MICHAEL PRESTWICH, EDWARD I 233 (1997). Alan Harding agrees, but is more
circumspect:
Because he [Robert Burnell] was so constantly with Edward, there is little written
evidence of his relationship with the king, or of his part in the genesis of the great
administrative and legal measures of the first half of the reign. It is significant,
however, that Burnell's chancellorship coincided exactly with the period of Edwardian
statute making, and no one but the chancellor could have had responsibility for
instituting the series of administrative inquiries and handling the growing stream of
petitions to the crown that together provided the basis for legislation in parliament.
Alan Harding, Burnell, Robert (d. 1292), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4055 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
171

Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw. I c. 1, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 26 (reprt.
ed. 1963)
172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id. (les damages qui il averunt eus, lor serra [regarde] e returne al double).

175

Id.
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provided for under the first Statute of Westminster has further significance in that the
Statute of Merton provided for multiple damages, but no fine.176
b. Sheriffs’ or Other Local or Royal Officials’ Abuse of Office: Chapters 15, 19, 24,
26, 27, 30, 32
These seven provisions are royal measures taken against corrupt officials. In all
of the provisions, either one or more of a fine, amercement, or other penalty
accompanies the multiple damages component. Chapter 15 provides that sheriffs or
other officials, among other punishments, must pay to the prisoner double any
reward (i.e., bribe) wrongfully received by him for delivering a prisoner who is
“replevisible.”177 That is, a prisoner who has paid the required surety is to be
released, similar to the payment of bail. In addition, the sheriff shall pay an
amercement to the king if the prisoner had paid sufficient surety.178 Alternatively,
that same sheriff, should he release a prisoner that is not “replevisable,” “shall lose
his Fee and Office for ever,” or suffer three years imprisonment and “make Fine at
the King’s Pleasure” if the release is “contrary to the Will of his Lord.”179 In like
manner, Chapter 26 provides that any sheriff or other king’s officer, who accepts any
“reward” other than their payment from the king, must pay “twice as much.”180 In
addition, that official shall “be punished at the King’s Pleasure.”181
Chapter 19, which also deals with sheriffs, provides that a sheriff is to pay to a
debtor three times what he receives from that debtor after pursuing the debtor when
the debt has already been paid; likewise any other person who does so must pay such
an amount.182 This provision requires the Sheriff to acquit royal debts in the
Exchequer, and failure to do so means that Sheriff shall be “atteinted” and pay the
plaintiff debtor “thrice as much as he had received” and “shall make Fine at the
Kings Pleasure.”183 The chapter also provides that any other person, who collects
royal debts and acquits them before the Exchequer, fails to acquit them and “shall
render thrice so much to the Plaintiff, and make Fine in like manner.”184
Chapter 24 related to unlawful possession of property, including land. It provided
that “double damages” were payable to a plaintiff for unlawful disseisin of freehold
or anything belonging to the freehold by escheators or other officials “by colour of
his Office.”185 It is then at the election of the disseisee (person disseised) that either
176 See Statute of Merton 1235, 20 Hen. 3 c. 6, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1-11 (reprt.
ed. 1963).
177

Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw. I c. 15, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 30 (reprt.
ed. 1963). The term “replevisible” is used as the English translation of the Old French word
“replivisables.”
178

Id.

179

Id.

180

3 Edw. I c. 26, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963).

181

Id.

182

3 Edw. I c. 19, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 32 (reprt. ed. 1963).

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

3 Edw. I c. 24, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963).
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the king can commence office proceedings to amend the disseisin or the disseisee
brings a writ of novel disseisin at common law. “[H]e that is attainted thereof shall
pay double Damages (il rendra [les damages] <le double> a mesme le pleintif) to
the Plaintiff, and shall be grievously amerced unto the King.”186
Chapter 27 required that any clerk other than a Clerk of the Justices in Eyre or a
Clerk of the Justices in Eyre who took more than the specified amount for delivering
“chapiters” must pay triple what he took.187 In addition, the official is punished with
a one-year suspension.188 In a similar vein, according to Chapter 30, an official must
repay in triple any amounts taken by extortion.189 In particular, this penalty applied
to Justices Marshals, who, in addition to being “grievously punished at the King’s
Pleasure,” must “pay unto [all] Complainants the treble Value (rendra la treble de
ceo qil avera issi pris) of that they have received in such manner.”190
In Chapter 32, those who “take part of the King’s Debts, or other Rewards of the
King’s Creditors for to make payment of the same Debt,” must pay double that
sum.191 Thus, those officials who took food or other things for the king’s use and,
after having received payment from the king via the Exchequer, withheld it from the
creditors “to their great damage, and slander of the King,” must pay double and
“shall be imprisoned at the King’s Will.”192
c. Causing Loss to Animals Taken in a Replevin Action: Chapter 17
Replevin was the “usual method of review” in the time of Edward I by which the
tenant could seek to recover his chattels that had been distrained by the lord, most
often an extra-judicial self-help means of enforcing the lord’s entitlement to services
against the tenant.193 The action of replevin required the lord, via the intervention of
the sheriff, to restore the tenant’s goods to the tenant when the tenant gave surety to
bring an action and restore the goods if he lost—that is, the impounded goods were
not to be sold or exploited and should be released, when the distrained person gave
pledges to appear in court.194
186

Id. Either “le double” or “al duble.” Id. at 33 n.7.

187 3 Edw. I c. 27, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963). Coke renders the Old
French as “chapiters.” EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 161 (Garland 1979) (1642). However, 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed.
1963) has “chapitres” and provides the English translation “Chapiters.” Coke explains that, in
proceedings before the Justices in Eyre, after twelve knights or free men were sworn in, “then
were read to them the Chapters or Articles of their charge in writing indented, the one part
whereof was delivered to them, and the other part remained with the Justices.” COKE, supra
note 187, at 211.
188

3 Edw. I c. 27, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963).

189

3 Edw. I c. 30, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 34 (reprt. ed. 1963).

190

Id.

191

3 Edw. I c. 32, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 34 (reprt. ed. 1963).

192

Id.

193

Id. at 223.

194

HUDSON, supra note 162, at 638 (citing D. W. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL
DISSEISIN 84 (1973)). Note that replevin was the standard method of review not just of the
seigniorial use of distraint but also of the use of distraint by others, of which the most frequent
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By means of Chapter 17, a plaintiff was entitled to double damages for any losses
to his animals that were the subject of a replevin action. Further, the failure to deliver
the animals under replevin has the consequence that the castle or fortress where the
animals were chased is to be “beaten down without Recovery” and “all the Damages
that the Plaintiff hath sustained in his Beasts . . . after the first Demand made by the
Sheriff or Bailiff, of the beasts, shall be restored to him the double [by the Lord, or]
by him that took the Beasts, if he have whereof.”195 Again, other penalties could
additionally apply to the imposition of multiple damages.
d. Barons or Bailiffs Committing Extortion Beyond Their Jurisdiction: Chapter 35
In Chapter 35, double damages were payable where “Great Men and their
Bailiffs” and others extort payment in excess of their jurisdiction and without
“especial authority.”196 In addition, those liable are to be “grievously amerced to the
King.”197 The wrong here is the taking of legal action by these great men and bailiffs
against persons in circumstances that imply usurping of royal jurisdiction, that is, “in
Prejudice of the King and his Crown, and to the Damage of the People.”198
These provisions in the Statute of Westminster I, dealing mostly with abuses of
royal officials and delegates and interference with property such as land and goods
(including animals), are significant. This is because the instances of multiple
damages occur in addition to and independently of other “punitive” measures, such
as imprisonment, fines, or amercement, and in addition to any compensatory
damages.
2. Roman Law Influence on Thirteenth-Century Statutes
Instances of statutorily imposed penalties representing payment to the victim of a
multiple of the actual loss sustained have existed in pre-Western ancient cultures for
millennia. Scholarly accounts of the history of punitive damages begin with the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi of c. 1772 BCE, one of the oldest deciphered
writings of significant length in the world. In the Code of Hammurabi, punitive
damages, in the sense of multiple damages, were payable for offences, such as
stealing cattle (from a temple, thirty-fold; from a freeman, ten-fold), a merchant
cheating his agent (six times the amount), or a common carrier failing to deliver
goods (five-fold their value).199
Likewise, under the Hittite Law of 1400 BCE, one who stole a “great” bull or
horse had to repay the owner multiple restitution (fifteen bulls).200 The Hindu Code
of Manu in 200 BCE, in cases of perjury, theft, and evasion of duties payable on
type was of animals found grazing on arable land or pasture without good reason. See E-mail
from Professor Paul Brand, All-Souls College, Oxford University, to Jason Taliadoros (Sept.
15, 2014) (on file with author).
195

3 Edw. I c. 17, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 31 (reprt. ed. 1963).

196

3 Edw. I c. 35, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 35 (reprt. ed. 1963).

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 2-3 (6th ed. 2010).

200

Id.
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goods, also required multiple restitution.201 Similarly, there is evidence that ancient
Greek law provided multiple damages, as did Ptolemaic law in Egypt.202
These pre-modern “statutes” specify damages that are characterized by the
following: (1) the amount of the damages are beyond mere compensation for the loss
sustained; (2) the amount of damages is a fixed multiple of the loss, depending on
the nature of the offence; (3) the damages are payable to the victim and so are
distinct from fines or penalties payable to the ruler or a regulating or administrative
body; and (4) the damages express outrage at the nature of the offence, that is,
society’s disapproval of that conduct and its deterrence of such conduct in the future.
Jolowicz further explains multiple damages in pre-modern laws: “The penalty is
made to fit, not the amount of damage inflicted by the tort, but the nature of the tort
itself. In other words, the principle of appropriateness, not . . . reparation, is the
guiding one.”203
Roman law, from its very beginnings, recognized that a wrongdoer might be
liable to make payments to the victim for an amount beyond the actual harm
suffered. The Twelve Tables, composed in the mid-fifth-century BCE, provided
several examples of multiple damages, in the form of fixed money payments, such as
where a party failed to carry out a promise, or where a party was a victim of usury.204
This multiple restitution, Jolowicz observes, is “a strong argument for the
preponderance of the idea of fittingness over that of reparation in fixing the
penalties.”205 Roman law recognized three “great torts:” (1) furtum, civil theft,
relating to the wrongful distribution of wealth; (2) damnum iniuria, “wrongful
waste,” directed against the wrongful waste of wealth; and (3) iniuria, a not-right or
a wrong, which protected personality or personhood.206 Each allowed for multiple
damages in the delictual action.
As discussed above, these notions from classical Roman law were transmitted via
Justinian’s sixth-century Corpus Iuris Civilis into the medieval West, including
England. This delictual action was penal and commonly resulted in the payment of
more than compensation.207 In terms of civil theft, a furtum nec manifestum (a thief
by night or “non-manifest theft”) involved double payment, while a manifest theft or
furtum manifestum, by day, involved a higher fourfold money payment.208 The
victim of a theft could demand to make a search with witnesses of any premises on
which he thought the goods were hidden.209 If the search was refused, he could exact
a fourfold penalty from the occupier. If the search was allowed, and the goods were
201

Id. at 228.

202

H. F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive Law, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL
ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOUR OF AND PRESENTED TO DOCTOR BOND, PROFESSOR BUCKLAND
AND PROFESSOR KENNY 203, 205-08, 216 (Percy H. Winfield & Arnold McNair eds., 1926).
203

Id. at 203-22.

204

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216.

205

Jolowicz, supra note 202, at 219.

206

Birks, supra note 112, at 5-6.

207

J. INST., supra note 115, at 1.5.

208

Id. at 1.5, 1.19(21).

209

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 212.
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found, the occupier of the premises was liable to a threefold penalty even if he knew
nothing of the matter.210 The victim could also obtain a threefold penalty from the
man who left the goods on the premises, but only if he did so to avoid detection.211
In terms of damnum iniuria or “wrongful waste,” this was dealt with in the
Digest 9.2 on the Lex Aquilia, a plebiscite promulgated by a Tribune of the Plebeian,
Aquilius, between 286 and 195 BCE. A text from Gaius on the Lex Aquilia provides
that “[a]n action for double damages may be brought against a person who makes a
denial”.212 Digest 9.2.23 states: “Where a slave is killed through malice [dolo], it is
established that his owner can also bring suit under criminal process by the Lex
Cornelia [de iniuriis],” which punished three kinds of injury committed by violence,
namely pulsare (beating), verberare (striking), and domum introire (forcible
invasion of one’s home)],213 and if he proceeds under the Lex Aquilia, his suit under
the Lex Cornelia will not be barred.214 Further on, Digest 9.2.27 states: “If anyone
castrates a boy slave, and thereby renders him more valuable, Vivianus says that the
Lex Aquilia does not apply, but that an action can be brought for injury [iniuriarum
erit agendum], either under the Edict of the aediles, or for fourfold damages [in
quadruplum].”215
F. The Reception of Iniuria and Statutory Multiple Damages into the Common Law
Maitland implies that the statutes may have been the result of influence from
Roman law sources, referring to the broad categorization of actions in Institutes
4.6.21.216 Maitland does not venture a firm opinion on this issue. Nor does he trace
the lines of influence that might have led to this influence. Scholarship dealing with
the influence of Continental legal learning on the English common law posits several
sources of influence.
In the late twelfth century, the Liber pauperum of Master Vacarius is evidence of
a school of Justinianic Roman law learning in England. The thirteenth century
witnessed an expanded number of texts of this law that would have been known to
clerks in the schools and who worked in ecclesiastical households. Peter Stein notes
the existence of a “standard package or kit” of Justinianic law learning in England
around 1200, which comprised the following: (1) Vacarius’s textbook, the Liber
pauperum, containing epitomized excerpts of the Code and the Digest, with gloss
spaces containing further excerpts from these titles; (2) the Institutes, with glosses,
the fundamental learning textbook of Roman law; (3) titles Digest 50.15 and 50.17,
the first a list of definitions or explanations of certain terms, the second a list of
maxims or rules; (3) another work on maxims, such as the Brocardica Dolum; and
finally (4) a work on Romano-canonical procedure, such as the Ulpianus de edendo
210

Id.

211

Id. at 210; see also 2 FRANCIS DE ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 201 (1953).

212

DIG. 9.2.2.1 (Gaius, On the Provincial Edict 7).

213 ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 549 (1953) (defining
“lex Cornelia de inuriis”); see also J. A. C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 371 (1976).
214

DIG. 9.2.23.9 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 18).

215

DIG. 9.2.27.28 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 18).

216 “Omnes autem actiones vel in simplum conceptae sunt vel in duplum vel in triplum vel
in quadruplum: ulterius autem nulla actio extenditur.” J. INST. 4.6.21.
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or the Olim edebatur actio.217 This full kit, or a variation of it, is evidenced by a
number of manuscripts from the beginning of the thirteenth century.218
Stein also observes that a similar kit, with the addition of the Decretales, appears
to exist around 1300 in a priory near Canterbury (Eastry).219 This indicates that there
may have been a continuous tradition from around 1200 to 1300 of such kits in
circulation and use, pointing to an ongoing influence of the Roman law learning in
England from the late twelfth right through the end of the thirteenth century.220
Supporting the contention that there was a school of Justinianic Roman law learning
in England at or around this time, Stein also refers to the popularity of Johannes
Bassianus in England around 1200, as is evident from his commentary on the
Institutes forming the first substratum for the Vacarian Lectura super Institutiones;
Stein even postulates that Bassianus may have been in England in the 1190s, but
puts forward no evidence in support of this.221
On the reception of Roman law in England, Maitland focused on Bracton. His
main concern was whether Bracton was aware of the distinction between crime and
tort. He concludes that Bracton did not evince a clear distinction between the two.222
This is despite Bracton recognizing the difference between compensatory remedies
and penalties:
Some personal actions arising ex maleficio pursue the penalty only, as the
actio furti, some the thing and the penalty, as the action vi bonorum
raptorum, and thus are double, since they are recuperatory [or
‘reipersecutory’, namely they result in payment of compensation only]223
and penal, and thus [mixed] both in rem and in personam.224
However, in explaining the assize of novel disseisin, the Bracton treatise notes
that it is personal, not public, since it is only against the disseisor, but penal because
it was done “wrongfully and without judgment,” and reipersecutory.225
217 FRANCIS DE ZULUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING
AROUND 1200 xliii (1990).
218

OF

ROMAN LAW

IN

ENGLAND

Id.

219

Id. at xliii (citing M. R. JAMES, THE ANCIENT LIBRARIES OF CANTERBURY
94-95, 106 (1903)).

AND

DOVER

220 See John S. Beckerman, Law Writing and Law Teaching: Treatise Evidence of the
Formal Teaching of Law in Late Thirteenth Century England, in LEARNING THE LAW:
TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF ENGLISH LAW, 1150-1900, 1, 33-50 (Jonathan A. Bush
& Alain Wijffels eds., 1999) (discussing evidence of treatise/formulary literature in formal
law teaching in England before 1300).
221

DE ZULUETA & STEIN,

222

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 523.

223

NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 210.

supra note 217, at l.

224 BRACTON, supra note 162, at 291 (“Personales vero actiones quae nascuntur ex
malificio, aliae persequuntur poenam tantum ut actio furti, aliae vero persequuntur ipsam rem
et poenam sicut actio vi bonorum raptorum, et ita sint duplices eo quod sunt rei persecutoriae
et poena, et ita tam in rem quam in personam.”).
225 Id. at 324 (“Item actio civilis cum aliquando triplex sit et quasi mixta, scilicet
personalis, poenalis et rei persecutoria.”).
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The action or interdict unde vi, according as it is double, that is,
recuperatory [reipersecutory] and penal, lies for one forcibly ejected
against the person who forcibly ejected him for recovering the possession
of the immovable from which he was ejected [in which case it is double in
the person of the ejector, as explained below in the portion on the assise
of novel disseisin], [and for a penalty], in the computation of which
neither death nor accident excuses the ejector.226
In sum, Bracton’s treatise, for Maitland, does not recognize a clear distinction
between crime and tort, because, although he is aware of both the reipersecutory and
penal elements, the double action and the triple action in the assize of novel disseisin
clearly mix both without explanation. Nevertheless, Bracton’s treatise indicates a
clear understanding of multiple damages for certain wrongdoing where mere
compensation for the actual loss suffered was not adequate as a remedy.
The anonymous Lectura super Institutiones that is attributed to a pupil of
Vacarius and of English provenance, composed several decades earlier than
Bracton’s treatise, also notes this difference between penal actions and compensatory
actions. It notes that the reference in the Institutes to alie tantum penam etc (“Some
[actions] are for a penalty only”) is to the actio doli, which, although delictual, falls
outside the category of “penal” because it is “for the plaintiff’s interest.”227 It also
notes in respect of Institutes 4.18 that there is a difference between public
prosecutions, which rest on the “common right,” and “actions” on individual right.228
Private actions sue for pecuniary penalty, while public actions aim for corporal
punishment to be carried out.229 It comments on Institutes 4.6.21: “Some actions are
for double damages, because they lie for double from the beginning; some are not so
from the beginning but become so through some later fact, such as denial of liability
or a delay in the case of legacies to sacred places.”230 This last reference to “double”
damages is unclear as to whether it differentiates compensatory from penal actions,
or compensatory awards representing a multiple of the actual damage suffered.
The commentary then goes to differentiate “aedilician actions” that are available
“to penalise our act,” unlike the noxal or pauperian action that lies only for the harm
caused and available as a direct action; the aedilician action “arises from the owner’s
neglect”.231 On Institutes 4.16 the Lectura notes that, for knowingly leading false

226 Id. at 296 (“Actio vero sive interdictum under vi secundum quod duplex est,
scilicet rei restitutoria et poenalis, datur contra eum qui vi deiecit, et datur ei qui vi
deiectus est ad restitutionem possessionis rei immobilis qua quis vi deiectus est. Et
quo casu duplex est in persona deiectoris, secundum quod inferius dicetur in assisa
novae disseisinae, et in qua nec mortalitas nec casus fortuitus liberat deiectorem.”).
227

“Actio de dolo, cum sit ex maleficio, extra hanc regulam est, cum sit ad interesse.”
ZULUETA & STEIN, supra note 217, at l14.
228

Id. at 138.

229

Id.

DE

230

Id. at 114 (“[Q]uaedam ita sunt in duplum quod ab initio sunt in duplum, quedam non
ab in(itio), sed per aliquod post factum, ut per infitiationem uel per dilationem eorum que
sacris locis legantur.”).
231

Id. at 125.
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evidence, the pecuniary penalty “is sometimes for simple damages, sometimes for
double, sometimes for triple or quadruple.”232
The Lectura super Institutiones deals with multiple penalties. For example,
“when someone delivers another’s slave to the emperor, so that he should free him;
there is a threefold liability to the owner and fourfold to the emperor.”233
Commenting specifically on the concept of tripli, the anonymous Lectura continues
that this threefold liability is claimed by condictio, that is by a “statement of claim”
in which the plaintiff details the amount and kind of money or other thing sought, his
own action, and the party against whom he was claiming.234 But if the plaintiff’s
claim included a larger sum than was owed to him, and he claimed fraudulently, that
plaintiff was liable threefold.235 The same Lectura also observes of Institutes 4.9 that
if a quadruped kills a man, 200 solidi will be paid, whereas an amount for the
medical expenses is paid if the man is merely injured. 236
The preceding references to the Justinianic Roman Law Lectura and its
differentiation between compensation and penalty occur in the context of the
widespread influence of ius commune learned law texts among literate and educated
English writers. David Ibbetson also points to other texts, some of them available to
Bracton and the anonymous author of the earlier Lectura super Institutiones, of
Justinanic Roman law sources that were known in England in the thirteenth century.
These include: (1) the Accursian gloss on the Corpus iuris civilis (known to the
author of the Lectura super Institutiones); (2) the works of Azo, or at the very least
his Summa Codicis, which was known to have been used by the author of Bracton;
(3) the glosses on the Decretals by Bernard of Parma and the commentary of Pope
Innocent IV; (4) the Speculum iudiciale of William Durandus; and (5) the canon law
works of Hostiensis, who is believed to have spent a considerable amount of time in
England in the 1230s and 1240s.237 Ibbetson also notes the availability of the
Decretum of Gratian, together with glosses on it;238 procedural works, such as the

232

Id. at 134.

233

Id. at 115 (“[U]t si seruum alienum quis principi traderet ut liberum faceret: domino
namque condempnandus est in triplum, principi in quadruplum.”).
234

Id.

235

Id. at 115 (“Tripl(um) condi(c)tione ex lege iustin(iani) petunt. conventionis
lib(ello): dicebantur ille in quo auctor quantitatem et qualitatem pecunie petende
siue alterius rei et etiam actionem suam et illum aduersus quem intenderet solebat
scribere et exprimere. Si ergo maiorem quantitatem quam sibi deberetur
comprehenderet, et hoc in dolo, ut reus maiores preberet sportulas. tunc id etc.”).
236

Id. at 125.

237 David Ibbetson, Civilian and Canonist Influence on the Writ of Cessavit Per Biennium,
in LAWS, LAWYERS AND TEXTS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOUR OF PAUL
BRAND 91, 95 (Susanne Jenks, et al., eds., 2012).
238 Ibbetson does not say when this would be available, but we know that Vacarius
composed a text on marriage in the late twelfth century (c. 1164-c. 1181) that relied on a close
reading of the Decretum, so we can estimate it was available by then. See JASON TALIADOROS,
LAW AND THEOLOGY IN TWELFTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: THE WORKS OF MASTER VACARIUS (C.
1115/1120-C.1200) 56-58 (2006).
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Summa de Ordine iudicario of Ricardus Anglicus (1190s); and the Summa Aurea of
William of Drogheda, which was also known to the author of Bracton.239
Some Justinianic Roman jurists spent time in England in the course of the
thirteenth century, and may have left a legacy that went beyond just their texts.
Bishop Stubbs mentioned the Roman civil law jurist, Francis Accursius (1225–
1293), son of the famous civilian Accursius of Bologna, as possibly adding
“technical consistency” to the local knowledge of custom and experience of others
such as Burnell, Hengham, and Britton, in the drafting the Statute of Westminster in
1275.240 Edward brought Francis with him to England when returning from the
crusades prior to his coronation, and Francis Accursius served as secretary to
Edward I between 1273 and 1281.241 The king invited him to Oxford, and in 1275 or
1276, he read lectures on law in the university before returning to Bologna in 1282,
where he practiced law until his death.242
His most important scholarly work was a Casus or epitome of the New Digest
(Digest 39.1-50.17).243 The documentary evidence for this life in England does not
link him directly with the activities of statute- drafting,244 and it is likely that his
engagement was for the expertise and inside knowledge that his Justinianic Roman
law learning in Bologna could offer Edward in his diplomatic dealings.245 But, like

239

Ibbetson, supra note 237, at 95.

240

2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
DEVELOPMENT 111-12 (6th ed. 1903-1906).
241

OF

ENGLAND: IN

ITS

ORIGIN

AND

George L. Haskins, Francis Accursius: A New Document, 13 SPECULUM 76, 76 (1938).

242 Robert C. Figueira, Francesco Accursius, in 1 MEDIEVAL ITALY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
744-46 (Christopher Kleinhenz ed., 2004).
243

Id. The NEW DIGEST was the name given to DIGEST 39.1-50.17 when the DIGEST was
divided into three parts. See F. P. W. SOETERMEER, UTRUMQUE JUS IN PECIIS. ASPETTI DELLA
PRODUZIONE LIBRARIA A BOLOGNA FRA DUE E TRECENTO [= ORBIS ACADEMICUS VII] 254-55
(1997); see also W. Senior, Accursius and His Son Franciscus, 51 L. Q. REV. 513, 515 (1935)
(observing that Francis Accursius did not write “anything of value,” but merely “some glosses
to the paternal magnum opus” that were “rather a work of supererogation”).
The NEW DIGEST makes reference to double (duplum) damages. See DIG. at 39.4.1.1,
39.4.1.5, 39.4.1.6, 39.4.1.9, 39.4.1.16; 40.7.10, 40.12.18, 40.12.20, 40.12.21; 41.1.7, 44.6.3,
46.8.20, 47.2.27, 47.2.47, 47.2.49, 47.2.51, 47.2.53, 47.2.56, 47.2.69, 47.2.76, 47.2.90, 47.3.1,
47.4.1, 47.5.1, 47.6.2, 47.6.5, 47.6.6, 47.7, 47.8.1, 47.8.4, 47.9.1, 48.5.28, 48.10.32, 50.8.9.
244

George L. Haskins, Three English Documents Relating to Francis Accursius, 54 L. Q.
87 (1938); see also George L. Haskins, The University of Oxford and the “Ius ubique
docendi,” 56 ENG. HIST. REV. 281, 281 (1941).

REV.

245

George L. Haskins & Ernst H. Kantorowicz, A Diplomatic Mission of Francis
Accursius and His Oration before Pope Nicholas II, 58 ENG. HIST. REV. 424 (1943). But Paul
Brand opines:
I think we now know enough about Francis Accursius to suggest that Edward I is most
likely to have used his services principally outside England, in diplomatic exchanges
and perhaps also for assistance in the parlement of Paris. Certainly there is little to
suggest he was consulted or involved in the drafting of English domestic legislation,
whose language (even when it was Latin) would have sounded very strange and
uncouth to him. There were certainly enough other English advisers around who knew
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Master Vacarius a century before him, we should not be too quick in dismissing his
possible influence on the court of Edward in matters separate from just diplomatic
ones. Haskins noted, that Accursius was not the only Italian at the Royal Court. At
about the same time in the chancery or wardrobe of the king were Stefano di San
Giorgio, a disciple of the “later school of literary style and associated with those
from the inner circle of Petrus de Vinea;” while, subsequent to Stefano’s departure,
there is evidence that another Italian clerk was involved in royal letter drafting.246
It is striking that the various kinds of wrongdoing in Statute of Westminster I
relate to important issues at law generally at this time, whether in Roman and canon
law or local law. Abuse of office was a significant issue in canon law, which was
attempting to separate individual clerics from their offices and Church property from
personal property.247 Guardianship was also a concern in Roman law, an issue
familiar to anyone who read the Institutes and its sections on cura and tutela.248
Further, the provisions on trespass to a religious house had clear resonance in canon
law on the protection of church property from secular interference.249 All these
concerns would have been matters that anyone with ius commune training would see
as having some obvious parallels in the English context.
If we can accept that there is the strong suggestion of Justinianic Roman law
influence from just before 1200 to around 1300 in England, in the form of legal
treatises that were in circulation in the schools and ecclesiastical households and in
the form of visiting masters from the law schools of Bologna, then the question of
doctrinal influence on the multiple damages provisions in thirteenth-century statutes
is no great mystery. Despite their articulation in the Norman French language that
was used in the courts, the Roman law concepts of double and triple damages as
applied to certain kinds of wrong were nevertheless capable of translation and
application into this vernacular by means of local men trained in the laws.

some Roman law for them to have suggested the idea of multiple damages, if a Roman
law source is needed.
E-mail from Paul Brand, Professor of English Legal History, All Souls College, to Jason
Taliadoros (Aug. 28, 2014) (on file with author).
246

Haskins & Kantorowicz, supra note 245, at 424 n.4.

247

Udo Wolter, The Officium in Medieval Ecclesiastical Law as a Prototype of Modern
Administration, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE, THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE IN EUROPE,
THIRTEENTH TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 17-36 (Antonio Padoa-Schioppa ed., 1997).
248
The powers of the guardian in Roman law were akin to those of a fiduciary. A guardian
was a “protector and defender” of those placed in his charge. J. INST. 1.13.2. He was required
to preserve the real property of the minor and restore it at the end of the guardianship. DIG.
27.9.1(Ulpianus, On the Edict 35); see also GIGLIOLA VILLATA DI RENZO, LA TUTELA.
INDAGINI SULLA SCUOLA DEI GLOSSATORI 271-303 (1975). This was so at canon law too. C.12
q.1 c.1. Vacarius himself had added glosses to that effect. THE LIBER PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS
185 (F. de Zulueta ed., 1927).
249

The phrase appellatione remota in canon law (X 2.28.53) (= 3 COMP. 2.19.11) was
used in the context of appointment of papal judges delegate as a way of providing immediate
redress for those whose property had been taken away by force. It restrained the right of the
forceful takers of the property to lodge an appeal to the papal court and thereby delay justice.
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G. Early English Custom as an Unlikely Source of Multiple Damages
The case for the influence of Roman law on punitive damages is strong, but does
not eliminate the possible influence of local custom. As the above discussion of the
provisions of the Statute of Westminster I shows, some provisions indicate the
“codification” of existing custom rather than the transplantation of outside law. For
example, the provisions regarding replevin do no more than codify existing custom.
Maitland—having a “bet each way”—also noted the influence of replevin as a
possible precedent from English law for these multiple damages notions.250 Bracton
referred to the action of replevin brought against a landlord who had detained or
“distrained” the chattels of his tenant.251 The chattels were returnable to the tenant
through the intervention of the sheriff if and only if the tenant gave surety “by gage
and safe pledges” to bring an action in the king’s Court, and make payment or return
the goods if he lost.252 The tenant, in this way, then sued the lord for taking the
goods, and the lord “avowed” (made his claim) for the services.
The usual context for the writ of replevin was where a lord sought to recover
arrears of rents and services from his tenant. Replevin was the “usual method of
review” by the time of Edward I.253 Significantly, in making his avowry of the
distraint of a tenant, the lord could allege that the rules for one particular tenancy
included a provision for multiplication of the rent once it had not been paid on time,
such as a doubling thereof.254
The custom of gavelet in the undated Customs of Kent 255 and the assize rolls,
and related to the tenure of gavelkind, is analogous to replevin. The Customs of Kent
state: “Let him nine Times pay, and nine Times repay the Arrears, and Five pounds
for the detention of the Rent, before he shall have his Tenement again.”256 We can

250

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522.

251

Id. at 523.

252

Id. at 524.

253 Id. at 523. Compare BRACTON, supra note 162, at 439-40 n.155, with GLANVILL, supra
note 162, at 142 (noting that the latter presumed that the chattels were still in the distrainor’s
hands, while the former did not). See also BAKER, supra note 52, at 271-72, 70; HUDSON,
supra note 162, at 638.
254

That is, “he was to double the rent the following day and treble it the third day.” Paul
Brand, 1300T.59: Richard of Weston v. Prior of Bermondsey and Others (unpublished
transcript and translation) (on file with the author). “1300T.5” means it is the fifty-ninth report
in Paul Brand’s unpublished transcripts and translations of reports of cases (plus matching
enrolments where found) belonging (or probably belonging) to Trinity term 1300. Paul Brand
has noted the large number of replevin cases in the thirteenth century up to the date of 1285,
beginning with a case as early as 1194. Paul A. Brand, Legal Change in the Later Thirteenth
Century: Statutory and Judicial Remodelling of the Action of Replevin, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
43, 51-52 (1987).
255

Consuetudines Cantiae, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM at 223-25 (reprt. ed. 1963); see
also N. Neilson, Custom and the Common Law in Kent, 38 HARV. L. REV. 482, 488-89 (1925)
(reviewing gavelet custom in Kent).
256

Consuetudines Cantiae, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 225 n.1 (reprt. ed. 1963). The
words are rendered not in Old French like the rest of the statute, but in Anglo-Saxon. See
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 187, 271 (noting the similarity to the eleven-fold
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see a clear case of influence of replevin or the gavelet on the provisions in Chapter
17 of the Statute of Westminster I of 1275.257
If the provisions of the Statute of Westminster I granting multiple damages were
the consequence of local customs, it is surprising then that there is no widespread
corroborating evidence linking replevin or gavelet with relief by way of multiple
damages in terms of the Roman law concepts duplum, triplum, or quadruplum. This
is all the more so since commentators on Edward’s thirteenth-century statutes
emphasize that the lord-tenant relationship was a problematic one at the time.
Powicke regards the statutes of the 1270s as a response to abuses by local and royal
officials of rights and liberties, especially practical difficulties within the ambit of
common law such as distraint.258
Paul Brand regards statutes from the earlier period, the late 1230s to the late
1260s, as part of the “baronial reform” movement; but, while this may have begun as
a “distinctly magnate political movement,” the legal reforms enacted tended to favor
tenants over their lords and therefore contrary to the interests of the magnates as a
group. Brand’s research was based on the unpublished and unprinted manuscript
material from the plea rolls and Year Books, while Powicke’s was built on printed
sources.259
But a search of printed sources from the twelfth to fourteenth-centuries does not
provide evidence of the custom linking replevin or gavelet with relief by way of
multiple damages in terms of the Roman law concepts duplum, triplum, or
quadruplum. A search of the Year Books of reported cases under the reign of Henry
III (1216-1272) reveals no mention of these concepts, either in the cases before the
Common Bench for the period 1268-1272, 1274-1278, or other cases of uncertain
dating but occurring before 1279.260 Similarly, a search of the Year Books for the
eyres conducted in Yorkshire in July 1268-July 1269, Northumberland in 1269,
Lincolnshire in 1272, Cambridgeshire in 1272, Norfolk in 1268-1269, and
Northamptonshire in 1269 reveals no results.261 Further, a search in the reported eyre
cases under the first half of the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) reveals no such
evidence in the Bedfordshire eyres of 1276, Hartfordshire eyres of 1278,
Cumberland eyres of 1278;262 nor in the reports from the Exchequer of the Jews

payment in the Bishop of Worcester’s customs in the Domesday Book and a nine-fold geld
payable to the king in some cases).
257

See SCHLUETER, supra note 199.

258

F. M. POWICKE, THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY: 1216–1307, 355, 370 (2d ed. 1962).

259 Paul Brand, The Making of English Thirteenth-Century Legislation: Some New
Evidence, in LAW IN THE CITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY
CONFERENCE, 2005, at 42 (Andrew Lewis et al., eds., 2007). See generally PAUL BRAND,
KINGS, BARONS AND JUSTICES: THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION IN
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2003).
260

1 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 1-183 (Paul Brand ed., 1995).

261

3 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 1-40 (Paul Brand ed., 2005).

262

Id. at 41-61.
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between 1272 and 1290; nor other reports from pre-1290.263 David Seipp’s index of
the Year Books, to both printed and manuscript versions, also returned no results.264
Printed select cases from the ecclesiastical courts during the reign of Edward
(admittedly including only a few cases up to 1275) contain prohibition cases from
1274 and 1275, the former in which the plaintiff is adjudged to “wage his law
twelve-handed,” but it makes no mention of multiple damages.265 Other
ecclesiastical cases date from 1279 and are too late for the purposes of this
analysis.266 A large collection of cases extracted from the plea rolls of the 1220s and
1230s appear in Bracton’s Note Book, on which G. B. Flahiff has undertaken
extensive research.267 Yet a word search of multiple damages cognates (“dupl-”,
“tripl-”, and “quad-”) failed to find a match, again disclosing no use of the terms
duplum, triplum, or quadruplum in those cases selected by Maitland as worthy of
editing.
The Patent Rolls (or Rotuli litterarum patentium) are a series of administrative
records compiled in the English Chancery, running from 1201 to the present day.268
They show no evidence of a discourse linking multiple damages and replevin for the
relevant period from 1201-1278. On January 20, 1263, the Rolls note that, in respect
of a notification that the king was “perturbed about the injuries, damages and
violences lately committed against the church and ecclesiastical persons in the
province of Canterbury,” and it recorded that those found responsible “shall make

263

4 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 462-590 (Paul Brand ed., 2006).

264

David J. Seipp, Medieval English Legal History: An Index and Paraphrase of Printed
Year Book Reports, 1268 – 1535, in LEGAL HISTORY: THE YEAR BOOKS, B.U. SCH. OF L. (Sept.
30, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp/ (finding the search terms “dupl,” “tripl,”
“quadr,” and “multipl” provided no hits that were dated before 1300).
265

SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES FROM THE KING’S COURTS 1272-1307 1 (David Millon
ed., 2009); see also David Millon, Introduction, in SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES xiv-cxxviii
(2009) (showing Selden Society volume and other publications are based on his unpublished
PhD dissertation, D. Millon, Canon Law and Common Law During the Reign of Edward I
(1982)).
266 SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES, supra note 265, at 72-82 (discussing cases from
Norfolk eyre of 1286).
267

See generally 1 HENRY DE BRAXTON, BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK: A COLLECTION OF CASES
DECIDED IN THE KING'S COURTS DURING THE REIGN OF HENRY THE THIRD (F. W. Maitland ed.,
1999); G. B. Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century (pt.
1), 6 MEDIEVAL STUD. 261 (1944); G. B. Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in
the Thirteenth Century (pt. 2), 7 MEDIAEVAL STUD. 229 (1945).
268 I have consulted the Rolls for the following periods: ROTULI LITTERARUM PATENTIUM IN
TURRI LONDINENSI ASSERVATI (Thomas D. Hardy ed., 1835) (reviewing the Rolls for the
periods 1201-1216); CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE [HENRY III AD 1216-1272] (1901-1913) [hereinafter LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF
HENRY III] (reviewing the Rolls for the periods 1216-1232); 1 CALENDAR OF THE PATENT
ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. [EDWARD I AD 1272-1307] (1893-1901)
[hereinafter CALENDARS OF PATENT ROLLS] (reviewing the Rolls for the periods 1232-1278). I
used G. R. Boynton, Calendar of Patent Rolls Search, U. IOWA LIBR. (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:03
AM), http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/patentrolls, to search the texts and calendars after 1216 and up
to 1452.
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competent amends before next Sunday, upon which Letare Jerusalem is sung.”269
There is no evidence of multiple damages here as there was to be in the 1278 statute
in clause 1 for forcible entry into religious houses. On June 25, 1256, the Rolls
record that “[f]or any trespass in the forest he shall not be amerced above the same
sum, on condition that he pay the damages according to a just valuation.”270 Again,
there is no mention of multiple damages here. The rolls of parliament, the official
records of the meetings of the English parliament from the reign of Edward I (12721307) until the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509), do not discuss multiple damages
either.271 The tentative conclusion from these absences is that there is no obvious
evidence of widespread customary use of multiple damages in relation to replevin
and its related action of gavelet.272
H. The Emerging Crime-Tort Distinction Between the Anglo-Saxon Period and the
Late Thirteenth Century
A common and oft-cited point of origin to punitive damages is the phenomenon
of compensation tariffs in Anglo-Saxon England. This discourse is difficult to
separate from the discussions above relating to multiple damages and damages in
respect of iniuria, as well as the seminal debate as to when the English common law
recognized a distinction between tort and crime. Some scholars assert an unbroken
line of development between modern punitive damages and the money compositions
in pre-conquest England.273 An understanding of monetary compensation and
feuding in pre- and post-Conquest England has undergone considerable revision in
recent scholarship, however.
It was a commonplace of nineteenth-century legal history that monetary
compensation overtook a feuding and vengeance culture, and that such a
development set justice on its way towards its fulfilment in centralized regnal
authority, public peace, and state-mandated punishment based on a moral liability
received through Christian penitential tradition.274 Against this linear notion of
evolution, recent histories emphasize instead the simultaneity of feud/revenge,
compensation, and punishment-based legal enforcement systems.275 Attention
269

5 LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268, at 378.

270

4 LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268, at 484.

271

Using Boynton, supra note 268, I was unable to find the term “damages” in either 1-6
LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268 or 1-2 CALENDARS OF PATENT
ROLLS, supra note 268.
272

I make no claim to undertaking a definitive search of all relevant sources, which is
beyond the scope of this Article. Additional research needs to be conducted on the unprinted
manuscript materials to investigate this more comprehensively.
273 See e.g., Wise v. Teerpenning, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 112, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (stating
the provisions as to damages in a 1837 wrongful death statute had such similarity “with the
[Anglo-Saxon] past . . . as to induce the belief that it [the Anglo-Saxon customs in seventhcentury Britain requiring money compositions for wrongdoing] was in the view of our
legislature”).
274 Valerie Allen, When Compensation Costs an Arm and a Leg, in CAPITAL AND
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 17 (Jay Paul Gates & Nicole Marafioti
eds., 2014).
275

Id.
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focuses on the gradual change from a system of feud in the seventh century, being
the earliest date for recorded Anglo-Saxon law, to one of punishment, a change well
underway by the eleventh century.
Tracing change in the historical phenomena of feud/revenge, compensation, and
punishment also has a crucial impact on accounts of when the common law first
began to conceive of a conceptual differentiation between tort and crime. It is
equally significant for the history of punitive damages. One aspect of this problem is
to identify when the common law moved from penalizing wrongdoing by way of
“money compositions” under the Anglo-Saxon kings, to one that provided for
individual compensation and penalties. The former is regarded as a communal or
private system characterized by tariffs and indicative of a system that does not
differentiate between torts and crime. The latter is “public” in the sense of being
administered by a centralized governing authority that distinguishes capital
punishment and fines—that is “crimes” on the one hand and compensation for loss
or “torts” on the other.
Another aspect of this issue, is at what time English law recognized crime as
distinct from lesser wrongdoing that also involved personal injury, namely what we
now call “torts.” The answer, is that compensation and punishment co-existed from
the Anglo-Saxon period, and the distinction only became apparent by the last quarter
of the thirteenth century.
1. Anglo-Saxon Money Compositions as a Precursor to Crime and Tort Laws
Anglo-Saxon customs and written laws reveal an approach to law that contained
a system of monetary compensation capable of redeeming what is nowadays called
crimes, including homicide and torts. The Anglo-Saxon laws evidence a “feud”
system, which contained both the personal self-help remedy of vengeance by force
of arms, and a system in which compensation tariffs were payable for commission of
wrongs. The customary laws regarding private vengeance contained the concept of
blood feud, which was based on family honor and tribal loyalty.
Although Guy Halsall insists that the term “feud” ought not apply in the context
of the Middle Ages because feud applies to reciprocal violence only without the
alternative of compensation, other scholars have taken a broader approach to the
term.276 What was present in the medieval period is what many other scholars have
termed feud, and what Halsall hoped to rename “customary vengeance,” describing
situations in which compensation serves as an alternative to violence, with the threat
of vengeance serving as motivating force for the payment of such compensation in a
composition settlement.277

276

Guy Halsall, Violence and Society in the Early Medieval West: An Introductory Survey,
in VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST 1, 19-20 (Guy Halsall ed., 1998); cf.
Paul R. Hyams, Was There Really Such a Thing as Feud in the High Middle Ages?, in
VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 151 (Susanna A. Throop & Paul R. Hyams eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Hyams, Vengeance in the Middle Ages] (modifying his earlier work PAUL R.
HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 33 (Barbara H. Rosenwein ed.,
2003) [hereinafter HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION])); see also John G. H. Hudson,
Faide, Vengeance, Et Violence En Angleterre (ca 900-1200), in LA VENGEANCE 400-1200 341
(Dominique Barthélemy et al. eds., 2006).
277

Halsall, supra note 276, at 22.
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This concept of “customary vengeance,” Halsall posits, is fairly close to what
was meant by early medieval Germanic terms such as faithu, faida, and the AngloSaxon term fæhðe.278 Although Halsall’s narrow use of the term is valuable in
drawing attention to the distinction between the role of feud as violence and the
system of monetary compositions as means of resolving disputes and wrongdoing,
many scholars continue to use “feud” in this early medieval context, albeit by
explicitly defining what they understand by that term.279 This section of the Article
provides an account of recent histories that have challenged existing understandings
of Anglo-Saxon money compositions.
Recent histories stress that compensation and punishment co-existed with
vengeance and violence in Anglo-Saxon codes. First, it is necessary to understand
the Anglo-Saxon system. The three kinds of payments referred to in this AngloSaxon context are the bot, the wergeld, and the wite. Compensation payable to the
victim for a non-lethal personal injury was the bot.280 Compensation paid to the
victim’s kin in reparation for “emendable” homicide was his wergeld, payable
according to the status of the man slain.281 An amount payable as a fine to the king
or to a local nobleman for breach of his peace was the wite.282
The earliest known law code in England, composed in the seventh century under
King Aethelbert of Kent (c. 602/3), provided for monetary payments. These were in
the form of a list of offenses for which compensation was payable to the victim by
particular sums of money, calculated according to the social status of the offender
and victim.283 There are numerous examples of multiple damages payments for
certain wrongdoing, or what Daniella Fruscione terms “embryonic” examples of
punitive damages.284 For example, Chapter 9 states that “[i]f the king is drinking at a
278

Id. at 28.

279 HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 6-11, 32-33. “[F]eud is one
of the main ways in which cultures formalize the working of vengeance, embody it within
some patterned format, presumably in order to minimize the risks of dissolution into
uncontrolled violence and chaos.” Paul R. Hyams, Afterword: Neither Unnatural nor Wholly
Negative: The Future of Medieval Vengeance, in VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 203, 206
(Susanna A. Throop & Paul R. Hyams eds., 2010) [hereinafter Hyams, Neither Unnatural nor
Wholly Negative].
280

HUDSON, supra note 162, at 198-99. For bot as compensation paid to the victim, see
Stanley Rubin, Bot Compensation in Anglo-Saxon Law: A Reassessment, 17 J. LEGAL HIST.
144, 148 (1996). Not to be confused with bot, the manbot was compensation payable to a slain
man’s lord, in addition to the wergeld. HUDSON, supra note 162, at 179. Although this Old
English word originally meant “compensation,” it came to mean payments to God, the
Church, men in general, or the king, from Alfred’s time (c. 890) onwards. In Alfred’s time it
referred to payments to secular lords rather than the victim or kin. Id. at 198-99.
281 HUDSON, supra note 162, at 179. Some forms of killing, linked to betrayal of one’s lord
or concealment, were “unamendable,” that is, not able to be satisfied by payment of the
wergeld. Id. at 166.
282

Id. at 188-91.

283

LISI OLIVER, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH LAW 59-81 (2002).

284

Id. at 59-63; see also FELIX LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN (reprt.
1960) (1903-1916); Daniela Fruscione, Beginnings and Legitimation of Punishment in Early
Anglo-Saxon Legislation from the Seventh to the Ninth Century, in CAPITAL AND CORPORAL
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man’s home, and anyone commits any evil deed there, he is to pay twofold
compensation.”285
The code has no explicit traces of corporal punishment, but in some of the
circumstances for which such compensation is awarded, there is a tacit suggestion of
punishment by payment. One example is the large payment for taking off someone’s
thumbnail.286 This procedure was administered “horizontally,” meaning that the
wrongdoer’s kin was responsible for the restitution if the wrongdoer fled or
escaped.287 In addition, the penal nature of some payments was evident: in cases of
theft, a wite or fine was payable to the king and in cases of murder a drihtinbeag,
containing both punishment and compensation, was payable to the king (containing
both punitive and restitutive elements).288
The influence of Christianity is evident in the codes of Wihtred of Kent, some
nine years after those of Aethelbert’s laws. In place of compensatory restitution were
fines, as well as corporal and capital punishments, exacted by the king, representing
the first instance of the application of punishment as a top-down phenomenon.289
Three hundred years later, a code composed, under the West Saxon King, Alfred,
witnesses “a real strategy to legitimize punishment. This starts with his long
prologue, which contains the Ten Commandments and other precepts from Mosaic
Law. Death penalties abound, imposed for murder, copulation with cattle, sacrifices
to false gods, and even for failing to enclose a dangerous ox.”290 Yet, the bot and
wergeld were also payable in the alternative.291
There are three uneasy and co-existent dynamics at play in these compensation
systems: vengeance, compensation, and punishment. Punishment and compensation
co-existed.292 The place of monetary compensation within this narrative is an uneasy
one, because it represents either, “limp substitute for revenge or ideologicallyinflected ‘progress’ towards centralized law.”293 But, for Fruscione, money in the
form of compensation tariffs, including the fine or wite payable for breaking the
king’s peace, are crucial to both revenge and punishment: that is, a third party
mediates and controls the exchange between the opposing parties by this means.294
The self-help justice of revenge was subject to the authority of “public approval of
fair play,” while compensation tariffs were exacted by regnal authority.295
PUNISHMENT IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 34, 35-37 (Jay Paul Gates & Nicole Marafioti eds.,
2014).
285

OLIVER, supra note 283, at 62-63.

286

Id. at 72-73.

287

Id. at 66-67.

288

Id. at 64-65.

289

Fruscione, supra note 284, at 38-39.

290

Id. at 41.

291

Id.

292

Id. at 34-35.

293

Allen, supra note 274, at 18.

294

Fruscione, supra note 284, at 36.

295

Allen, supra note 274, at 19.
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Valerie Allen characterizes vengeance and punishment as two vectors of force:
vengeance tracking a horizontal line of reciprocal violence between (roughly) equal
bodies (whether kin or entire communities), while punishment thrusts vertically and
uni-directionally down from top (“state,” ecclesiastical, or regnal power) to bottom
with a mandate of authority that preempts, at least in theory, reprisal from family and
friends of the disciplined offender.296 The punishment that ensued, in the corporal
punishment provisions in the later Anglo-Saxon codes, was a “Christianized
violence” that prefigured the twelfth-century “spiritual economics” of purgatory that
enabled pre-payment of a sinner’s debt to God and moved social order from a
compensatory to a “disciplinary” mindset in a process that involved a “theologizing”
of the law.297 It is a moot point whether the revenge/punishment distinction is a valid
one. The line between “handing over body parts in payment” (feud-revenge) and
having them taken in punishment is a fine one.298 For example, King Edgar’s law of
talion provides for mutilations that both deter other possible offenders and save the
soul of the offender by provoking suffering without death.299
Controversy remains as to whether these compensation tariffs were adjustable or
not. Stanley Rubin argues not, claiming that where personal injury occurred, the bot
or compensation was fixed regardless of rank, while this criterion determined the
amount of one’s wergeld, in the case of death.300 Rubin, commenting on the two
most important English codes because of their comprehensiveness and coverage—
those of Aethelbert of Kent and Alfred of Wessex—notes that the compensation
amounts were fixed relative to the wergeld of an ordinary freeman.301 In contrast,
Lisi Oliver infers from the incompleteness of circumstantial detail that the written
tariffs constituted the maximum penalty and were therefore adjustable.302 Oliver’s
arguments in support of a degree of latitude in the application of the amounts,
according to Allen, seems to better support the contemporary historical conditions
when coinage was scarce, payment in kind was common, and the lack of
precedential binding value of these customs.303 This suggestion, that the
compensation payments were variable and adjustable, further reduces their definite
demarcation from more modern concepts of proportionate compensation.
As T. F. T. Plucknett has shown conclusively, an important purpose of AngloSaxon legal proceedings was to secure pecuniary compensation, and it was not a
296 Id. at 17. Allen cites a recent study by Hyams, although it is quite different from
Allen’s formulation. See Hyams, Neither Unnatural nor Wholly Negative, supra note 279, at
217-18.
297
Caroline Walker Bynum, The Power in the Blood: Sacrifice, Satisfaction and
Substitution in Late Medieval Soteriology, in THE REDEMPTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
SYMPOSIUM ON CHRIST AS REDEEMER 177, 192, 198 (Stephen T. David et al. eds., 2004).
298

WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 35 (2006).

299

Allen, supra note 274, at 18.

300

Rubin, supra note 280, at 146-51 (noting some exceptions for clergy and for genital
damage).
301

Rubin, supra note 280, at 148.

302

LISI OLIVER, THE BODY LEGAL IN BARBARIAN LAW 50-51 (2011).

303

Allen, supra note 274, at 20.
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large step from the bot to the damages of later law.304 Whether these Anglo-Saxon
compensation tariffs of the eleventh century had influence beyond that century,
particularly on the doctrine of multiple damages in the thirteenth-century statutes and
law, is an issue that, to date has no clear answer. It was Maitland’s view that preconquest tariffs did not extend beyond the twelfth century.305 The late Patrick
Wormald was a staunch and articulate proponent of an opposing view.306 Wormald
has few adherents to his line of argument, although many scholars judge that
Maitland located the change too early.307 Yet evidence points to the persistence of
this Anglo-Saxon system of compensation into at least the early decades of the
twelfth century. As John Hudson puts it, in summary of this pre-Conquest system,
“[c]ompensation and punishment co-existed, the balance between them a matter of
considerable significance.”308 For example, the Leges Willelmi, or Leis Willelme,
from the early twelfth century, contains both provisions for compensation for the
head of an opponent who could not be produced in court and for the wergeld
payment.309
The concept of vengeance also persisted into the twelfth century, as the Leges
Henrici Primi attests.310 Moreover, this law code demonstrates that wrongs were
identified as having two elements: first, the damage or loss inflicted, and second, the
affront to honor, and related injured feelings, that the deed entailed.311 Interference
with the free enjoyment of landholding related to interference with the free, quiet,
and honorable holding of that land, implicitly amounting to an affront to honor, or
iniuriae.312 In both pleading formularies and local court records from the thirteenth
century, money is frequently demanded not only for economic loss but also for

304

T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 370 (5th ed., 1956).

305

See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 523-24.

306 But Patrick Wormald argues that Maitland was “wrong” to say that late Anglo-Saxon
law retained a “scheme of wer and bloodfeud, of bot and wite (blood-price . . . amendment
and fine).” Compare 1 PATRICK WORMALD, THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW: KING ALFRED TO
THE TWELFTH CENTURY: LEGISLATION AND ITS LIMITS 17 (1999), with POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 160, at 448.
307 Naomi Hurnard, in her study of medieval homicide, observes that the end of the
wergeld system occurred in the later years of King Henry I’s reign. NAOMI D. HURNARD,
KING’S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE AD 1307 9 (1969).
308

HUDSON, supra note 162, at 178.

309

HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 147-48; LIEBERMANN, supra
note 284, at 492-520 (referring to Leges Willelmi or Leis Willelme or “Leges Wmi”); see also
OF
LONDON
Early
English
Laws:
Texts,
UNIV.
http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/texts/leis-wl1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
310 David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76
B.U. L. REV. 59, 64 n.28 (1996) (citing LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 261 (L.J. Downer ed. & trans.,
1972)). Hudson also notes that the Leges Henrici Primi still required compensation by way of
wergeld and wite for homicide, as well as circumstances requiring physical punishment. See
HUDSON, supra note 162, at 409-410.
311

LIEBERMANN, supra note 284, at 282-83 (citing Beckerman, supra note 115, at 165-66).

312

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 169.
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shame, dishonor, insult or outrage, or disparagement.313 The Leges Edwardi shows
“limited interest” in wergelds and their payment, but hints of payment for homicide
remain.314
2. The Distinction Between Crime and Tort
When did the English common law recognize a distinction between crime and
tort? This Article will not attempt to provide a definitive response to this
imponderable, but will instead lay out the nuanced considerations that scholars have
marked for attention. For example, according to Paul Hyams, both the action of
trespass and the appeal of felony developed by the later thirteenth century at the
latest.315 Instead of attempting to place a specific date on this change, Hyams instead
traces historical developments from around 1100, when a “single undifferentiated
action for all serious private secular wrongs” existed, in which there was no clear
discernible difference, as we would understand it between torts and crimes.316 This
undifferentiated action appears in the anonymous Leges Henrici Primi (c.1100). The
other chronological endpoint is the time by which the felonious appeal, or “appeal,”
existed, which represented a clear distinction between crime and tort in the late
thirteenth century.317 Hyams points to five “necessary conditions” for the separation
of trespass and appeal, that led to the differentiation of crime from tort.318 It is worth
setting out this gradual process in some detail, and in light of other recent
scholarship.319
First was the need for a doctrinal distinction between law and fact, illustrated by
the maxim from Digest 3.2.11.4 that “ignorance of the law is not excusable, but
ignorance of the fact is.”320 The distinction between law and fact is also indicated in
the widespread use of the jury in royal courts in real property actions. These royalcourt juries gave real-property verdicts based on factual issues, not legal ones. This

313 Id. at 173-76. In the French law of the formularies the usual term is huntage (mod. Fr.
honté).
314

HUDSON, supra note 162, at 410 (citing Leges Edwardi Confessoris, EARLY ENG. LAWS
18, 12.6, http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/texts/ecf1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016)).
315

Hyams, VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 276, at 159-60.

316

Id. at 157.

317

HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 151 (citing Beckerman,
supra note 115, at 161-81). Müller concurs that the appeal of felony in thirteenth-century
England contained the requisite elements of a crime: namely, royal jurisdiction by means of
the crown pleas of felonious offences (placita coronae feloniae) and which were handled by
the king’s officials. This warranted the maximum penalty of execution by around 1200 (for
robbery, rape, and manslaughter) and decision-making of guilt by lay juries, not ordeal.
Overall, these appeals connoted crimen as “mandatory prosecution and sentencing.”
WOLFGANG P. MÜLLER, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION IN THE WEST: ITS ORIGINS IN
MEDIEVAL LAW 67 (2012).
318

HYAMS RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 216-41.

319

Id. at 231.

320

DIG. 3.2.11.4 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 6).
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development occurred by the mid-twelfth century as a result of the inheritance of
Roman law learning into the schools of England and Western Europe.321
The second requirement was the recognition of the further doctrinal
differentiation between crime and tort.322 This distinction first emerged around 1166,
from the reception of Justinianic Roman law in Western Europe and then England,
and was recognized in an inchoate way by the Glanvill treatise (c. 1187-1189),
which divided pleas between civil and criminal.323 The Glanvill treatise, however,
when discussing the criminal pleas, included virtually all wrongs within it, including
the plea of the king’s peace.324 Further, as T. F. T. Plucknett has observed, Glanvill’s
distinction bore little relation to the state of law in his time.325 But it was Bracton’s
treatise composed in the mid-1220s that ensured the triumph of this distinction,
defining crime as a breach of the peace, implying its public nature.326 Major crimes
(often termed crimina capitalia) carried punishment to “life and members” (i.e.,
capital punishment) while minor crimes, such as trespass and replevin, carried
pecuniary consequences only.327
This distinction drawn by Bracton did not settle the matter. By the late thirteenth
century the authors of Fleta and Britton, both writing around 1290, took opposite
lines—one adopting Bracton; the other not.328 This contrasts with the earlier
distinction between crime and delict or tort that jurists in canon law and Justinianic
Roman law had drawn between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.329 The jurists of
the “learned laws” articulated to a high level of abstraction by the mid-thirteenth
321 Hyams, VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 276, at 157, 162; see also
HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276 at 3-33 (indicating that a date around
1166 when Justinianic Roman law learning reached England, thus modifying his earlier.).
322

Hyams, Vengeance in the Middle Ages, supra note 276, at 220.

323

“Placitorum aliud criminale aliud civile.” GLANVILL, supra note 162, at i.1, 3.

324

Id. at i.1-4, 3-5; see also the editor’s introduction, G.D.G. Hall, Introduction to
GLANVILL, supra note 162, at i, xx, (setting out a table listing “civil” and “criminal” pleas);
Charles Donahue, Jr., The Emergence of the Crime-Tort Distinction in England, in CONFLICT
IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 219-28 (Warren Brown & Piotr Górecki eds., 2003); Charles Donahue,
Jr., Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law, and Modern Civil Law: Ius Commune,
Canon Law, and Common Law in England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1992).
325

PLUCKNETT, supra note 304, at 422.

326 “In primis de pace domini regis et iustitia eius violate per murdritores et robbatores et
burgatores.” BRACTON, supra note 162, at 327 n.115.
327

Id. at 334 n.118 (translating “De crimine laesae maiestatis”); id. at 340 n.120
(translating “De crimine homicidii et qualiter dividitur”); id. at 359 n.127; see also Hyams,
Vengeance in the Middle Ages, supra note 276, at 159.
328 “[B]ecause the lives and members of men, whether to protect or to condemn when they
do wrong, are in the power of kings and not of others . . . . There is also a certain penalty
which is called pecuniary and which . . . is regarded as less than the least corporal
punishment.” 2 FLETA, 34-35 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds., trans., 1955). FLETA
follows Bracton, while BRITTON does not.
329 Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, Crime ou délit? Le droit romano -canonique à la recherche
d’un critière distinctif, in DER EINFLUSS DER KANONISTIK AUF DIE EUROPÄISCHE
RECHTSKULTUR 37 (Orazio Condorelli et al. eds., 2012).
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century differences between the two terms, based on the intention of the act, the
seriousness of the consequences, and the penalty imposed on the wrongdoing.
The third criterion was the expansion of the king’s peace into a national
protection for all the king’s subjects and all inhabitants of the realm.330 In this
context, peace meant “protection” or “law.” One means was by royal grants of
protection by charter; thus converting wrongs done to grantees, such as religious
houses, into injuries actionable as if done to the king himself.331 Another means was
by the proliferation of specific grants of peace.332 A third means was by the
development of the pleading of special contempts (“tickets”) that brought new
business into the royal courts.
These special contempts were part of the first wave of trespass writs in quare
form, which did not mention peace at all. The crux was that men and women could
seek remedies from the king for wrongs committed against them, as wrongs in
breach of “the lord king’s peace.”333 Alan Harding has suggested that the
development of special contempts was the impetus for the birth of the trespass writ,
with its fundamental focus on breach of the king’s peace.334 Hyams adds that the
special contempts or “tickets,” which were part of the first wave of trespass writs in
quare form, do not mention peace at all.335 Therefore, Hyams argues, it was these
private initiatives, just as much as the royal ones that led to the expansion of the
king’s peace.336
The fourth and fifth factors are related, and most appropriately considered
together. The fourth necessary factor was the rise of the public prosecution of
“crime,” emerging from the Assizes of Clarendon (1166) and of Northampton
(1176), which called for juries of presentment at eyre.337 Alongside this, grand juries
and indictments were established in the last decades of the twelfth century, thus
publicizing the king’s duty to provide peace for all his subjects.338 This separated
common law trespass from the appeal of felony.
But the individual’s sense of his personal injury from an offense against the
king’s higher authority often brought about an action under the French term
trespas—consciously excluding the words ‘felony’ to remove it from more formal
procedures of the criminal appeal, as well as removing the risks to their own bodies
of that appeal. Richard Fraher marks the beginning of an understanding of criminal
law as a matter of public law, rather than private law, at canon law in the 1203

330

HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 224-26.

331

Id. at 224.

332

Id. at 224-25.

333

Id. at 225.

334

Id. at 224.

335

Id. at 226.

336

Id.; cf. Alan Harding, Introduction, in THE ROLL
xlix-li (Alan Harding ed., 1981).

OF THE

SHROPSHIRE EYRE

337

HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 226.

338

Id. at 227.
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decretal of Pope Innocent III that “as a matter of public utility crimes should not
remain unpunished,” which was employed from the thirteenth century onwards.339
A fifth factor was common-law felonies, which were offenses in the group
felonia considered appropriate for indictment by juries under the new assize
procedure of 1176.340 Hyams opines that the categorization into a term of art of the
word “trespass” as expressing a vernacular sense of wrong emerged in the plea rolls
after 1258.341 These were distinct from the appeal of felony (i.e., criminal law) heard
in royal courts because of the exclusion of words of felony.342
Although situating the emergence of the distinction between crime and tort in the
English common law in the thirteenth century, David J. Seipp argues that the
distinction arose as a consequence of contingency dependent on whether the plaintiff
chose to pursue his right by way of appeal of felony, indictment of felony, or
indictment of trespass, which corresponds to modern notions of crime, or by the writ
of trespass, which corresponds to modern notions of tort.343 The recourse to appeal
of felony was punishment of a defendant’s “life and members,” i.e., capital
punishment often by a death sentence, or, more frequently, corporal punishment
without payment of compensation to the plaintiff.344 The writ of trespass alleging
force of arms against the king’s peace required a defendant to make payment of
compensation to the plaintiff.345 In addition, the courts could impose punishment by
way of fine and imprisonment.346
Significantly, the appeals of felony or indictments of felony/trespass arose when
a plaintiff sought vengeance over compensation from a defendant—such notions of
vengeance replaced bloodfeuds. Royal officers pursued wrongdoers when a plaintiff
feared or chose not to do so. “This conceptual distinction [between crime and tort],”
Seipp observes, “is best presented as a choice, therefore, among several options
available to victims of breaches of the king’s peace.”347 The choice was not
dependent on the nature of the wrongdoing, since writs of trespass included any kind
of wrong “from murder to a slap on the face to diverting water onto someone’s
land,”348 while appeals of felony were available for any of the traditional common
339 Richard M. Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High
Middle Ages: “rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita,” U. ILL. L. REV. 577,
578 (1984).
340 “In omnibus autem placitis de felonia solet accusatus per plegios dimitti preterquam in
placito de homicidio ubi ad terrorem aliter statutum est.” GLANVILL, supra note 162, at xiv.1,
172.
341

HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 333.

342

Id. at 231-41.

343

Seipp, supra note 310, at 59.

344

Id. at 61-62.

345

Id. at 61-5.

346

Id. at 77.

347

Id. at 60.

348

Id. at 68. Further, while every felony was a trespass, not every trespass amounted to a
felony. In addition, writs of trespass covered the wrongdoing evident in the French language
words “tort” and “malfeasance” and the Latin terms “delict” and “injury.” Id.
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law felonies, including homicide, rape, mayhem (maiming), robbery, burglary,
larceny, and arson.349
3. Iniuria as the Primary Influence on the Distinction Between Crime and Tort law
The preceding account of the crime-tort distinction largely confirms Hyams’s
account of an inconsistent, irregular, contingent separation of the two. But, important
as his and other scholars’ narratives are of this phenomenon, the notion of iniuria is
largely absent. Despite the decline in importance of the Anglo-Saxon compensation
systems, the notion of vengeance and retribution inherent in the concept of feud that
was so inextricably linked to such systems of compensation tariffs did not altogether
disappear. If part of vengeance was tit-for-tat retribution for affront or dishonor, such
notions subsisted in the awards of damages that emerged following the clearer
demarcation between the boundaries of tort and crime. How did the English common
law deal with the concept of insult, hurt feelings, or shame that sometimes
accompanied personal injury caused by wrongdoing?
Insult is notably absent from the modern common-law tradition, which awards
compensation for damage or loss suffered, but ignores affronts to honor entirely. An
important study by John S. Beckerman observes that other European legal traditions
that emerged from Roman law made free use of the concept of insult or outrage, and
influenced English law temporarily between around 1166 until the end of the
thirteenth century, when records of compensation for wounded honor disappear.350
Beckerman agrees that the Anglo-Saxon forms of monetary compositions
continued into the thirteenth century, particularly in local courts, in the sense that
money is frequently demanded not only for economic loss, but also for shame,
dishonor, insult or outrage, or disparagement.351 This research of local court records
confirms the findings of Richardson and Sayles on pleading formularies, which they
viewed as part of the academic training offered lawyers and estate administrators by
the Oxford dictatores but which had little influence on pleadings in court.352 The
simultaneous continuity of the Roman law concept of iniuria is clearly evident here.
Beckerman makes several observations from these court records from the mid- to
late-thirteenth century. First, the phrases alleging dishonor appear in lawsuits
involving a whole variety of wrongs from defamations to forcible injuries to
breaking obligations to defaulting on transactions. “Any of these offenses could be
counted a contumely, insult, affront to personal honor. Regardless of the specific
circumstances of the wrongs, it is evident that the victims felt dishonored or
disparaged by them.”353
Second, the specimen counts from the pleading formularies usually distinguish
separate amounts claimed for damage and shame, although most of the examples in
the court rolls include an undifferentiated combined sum.354 In only a few cases does
349

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 470; see also Seipp, supra note 310, at 61.

350

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 179-181.

351

Id. at 173.

352

H. G. Richardson & G. O. Sayles, Introduction, in SELECT CASES
xciii-cxv (1941).
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PROCEDURE

WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III,
353

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 174.

354

Id. at 175.
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the amount claimed for dishonor exceed the amount claimed for damage, these
involving defamation or public insult, in which direct attacks on reputation led to
obvious disparagement or dishonour as well as economic loss. A plea of trespass
contained three distinct elements: (1) vim (vi et armis)355 et (2) iniuriam et (3)
damnum suum.356 Dealing specifically with iniuria, it was the concepts of affront
that Bracton had in mind when he wrote of the actio iniuriarum to describe the
English plea of trespass. Here he consciously used the term from Roman law.357
These pecuniary claims for damage and dishonor in thirteenth-century local court
records were related to other accusations that mixed civil and criminal elements,
such as the appeal that sought damages and the trespass count that alleged felony.358
As the action of trespass flourished in the royal courts, the iniuria, or affront to
honor, disappeared as an operative element in English tort law, eclipsed totally by
the element of economic loss. Beckerman notes that this disappearance occurred by
the end of the thirteenth century when, although trespass pleas could still serve both
compensatory and penal ends, the means for doing so was by statute, which provided
not only compensation, but also punitive damages and, on occasion, imprisonment
for the offender.359 The earlier discussion of the thirteenth-century statutes
establishes the significance of these enactments in providing for multiple damages,
although not necessarily at the exclusion of the notion of iniuria.360
Beckerman reasons that the disappearance of the notion of iniuria was because of
the changing nature of the writs of trespass by the end of the thirteenth century.361 As
documented by Plucknett and Milsom, writs of trespass early in that century almost
exclusively concerned what Glanvill had termed “civil” matters, which concerned
land or feudal matters.362 That is, these trespass writs, on the one hand, did not deal
with “criminal” matters that gave rise to felonious appeals, nor, on the other hand,
did they deal with the less serious wrongdoing that we may associate with modern
day torts, such as battery and assault.363
355 S. F. C. Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III: More Special Writs and
Conclusions (pt. 3), 74 L.Q. REV. 561, 574 (1958).
356

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 176.

357

Id. at 176-77; BRACTON, supra note 162, 363.

358

George E. Woodbine, Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 801-02, n.10
(1924); see also Richardson & Sayles, supra note 352, at cxxxi-xxxii.
359 Beckerman, supra note 115, at 179 (citing P LUCKNETT, supra note 304, at 457); see
also Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 20, in STATUTES OF THE REALM 32 (reprt. ed.
1963) (stating that a writ of trespass against poachers gave “punitive damages” to the plaintiff
as well as a fine and imprisonment); Statute of Westminster 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 35, in
STATUTES OF THE REALM 88-89 (reprt. ed. 1963) (stating that a writ of trespass gave rise to
“punishment” by life imprisonment). Hudson makes a similar argument. See HUDSON, supra
note 162, at 411-12.
360

See supra Part II.F.

361

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 179.

362

GLANVILL, supra note 162, at xx.

363

These types of civil disputes—land/feudal and trivial matters—were dealt with in the
royal courts by means of the writs ostensus quare (i.e., “to show why” a deed had been done),
and contained pleading that the act was done in “breach of the king’s peace” (contra pacem)
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By the end of the thirteenth century, the forms of words contra pacem and vi et
armis in these civil writs took on such artifice that nearly all non-felonious
trespasses came within their remit, and the king’s courts took on all of these matters.
In principle, such acts were in breach of the king’s “peace;” and what made it a
breach of the king’s peace was “the person, the place, even the season;” and so the
concern here was with dishonor to the king—not the personal honor of the king’s
subjects.364 On the criminal side, as the writ de odio et atia taught so clearly, royal
justice was not supposed to be used for purposes of private retribution.365 On the
civil side, the king’s courts provided no remedy by which subjects could vindicate
personal honor, leaving the law of defamation to remain undeveloped in the common
law in the fourteenth century, as a subject left to the lesser tribunals, local secular
courts, and the ecclesiastical courts.366 Thus, Beckerman argues, it was precisely
because royal jurisdiction was founded upon the idea of affront to the king’s honour
that, for everyone else, honor and shame ceased to be legally meaningful
categories.367
III. CONCLUSION: INIURIA AS THE COMMON THREAD
The extensive meta-narrative presented in this Article suggests that Beckerman
may have been somewhat preemptive in signaling the end of the conceptual
influence of iniuria by the close of the thirteenth century as a pre-modern analogue
to the exemplary, retributory, or punitive element that calls for punitive or exemplary
damages in tort. The provisions in the Statute of Westminster I that call for multiple
damages seem to indicate the continuity of notions of iniuria well into the late
1200s. Indeed, the longevity of these provisions in subsequent case law and
legislation, and the appearance of multiple damages provisions in later statutes,
further suggest the ongoing influence of the concept of iniuria and its cognates. This
suggestion, of course, depends on the hypothesis that multiple damages in the
statutes sprang from Roman law, and more particularly from Roman law notions of
iniuria.
and “with force and arms” (vi et armis). PLUCKNETT, supra note 304, at 481. Such “civil”
trespasses were an exclusive plea of the crown and thus outside the sheriff’s competence and
outside the jurisdiction of the manorial courts. Id. Plucknett also notes the more familiar forms
of trespass: de clauso fracto (unlawfully entering on land), de bonis asportatis (taking away
chattels), and assault. Id. at 403; see also S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 288 (2d ed., 1981).
364 Beckerman, supra note 115, at 180-81 (citing PLUCKNETT, supra note 304, at 457); see
also MILSOM, supra note 363, at 286-95.
365

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 181.

366

By the end of the twelfth century, malicious prosecutions were seen as a sufficient
problem for the royal government to provide a writ to enable a person imprisoned following
an appeal to challenge the bona fides of the appeal. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at
587-89. This was the writ de odio et atia; it was ostensibly directed against those who brought
appeals out of “hate and spite,” by expeditiously providing an inquest to investigate appeals
alleged to be malicious or exaggerated: the procedure became immensely popular during King
John’s reign (1166-1216). Id.; HURNARD, supra note 307, at app. I; see also Susanne Jenks,
The Writ and the Exception de odio et atia, 23 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2002) (explaining the
differences between the writ de odio et atia and the exception de odio et atia).
367

Beckerman, supra note 115, at 180-81.
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Law is ever backward looking. Lord Chief Justice Pratt, when deciding
cases in the latter 1700s in a context when his own judicial power to determine
damages swung, to some extent back, from the jury to the bench, revealing a search
for doctrine by taking a long glance back to the statutes and cases of the late Middle
Ages. Sayer’s near-contemporaneous textbook on damages reveals a similar
inclination. The thirteenth century played a longstanding and pivotal role in the
future development of the common law in England. Paul Brand has commented on
this century, particularly on the statutes produced under Edward I, in just such a
way:
During the later Middle Ages knowledge of the major Edwardian statutes
was an essential prerequisite for any practising lawyer. It seems probable
that many of them possessed a book of the ‘old’ statutes, a large part of
which contained the legislation of Edward’s reign. In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries lectures on the legislation of Edward’s reign formed a
core element in the educational curriculum of the Inns of Court. As late as
the early seventeenth century, Edward Coke’s Second Institutes, dealing
with the older legislation which a law student would have to master, was
concerned mainly with legislation of this reign. In his introduction to the
Second Institutes, Coke became the first to describe Edward I as ‘our
Justinian.’368
The extent, nature, and duration of the influence of the “learned laws” on the
common law of England is a matter that scholars will continue to debate for
generations to come. This Article charts a tentative, but suggestive, pathway that the
sources dictate and invites others to pursue the leads I have outlined, and make up
their own minds.

368 Paul A. Brand, Legal Change in the Later Thirteenth Century: Statutory and Judicial
Remodelling of the Action of Replevin, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 n.1 (1987). The Second
Institutes were published posthumously in 1642. Allen D. Boyer, Coke, Sir Edward (1552–
DICTIONARY
OF
NAT’L.
BIOGRAPHY,
1634),
OXFORD
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4055 (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
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